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181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
182   $cc$2rdamedia
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200 10$aPhenomenal consciousness $ea naturalistic theory /$fPeter Carruthers$b[electronic resource]
210  1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2000.
215   $a1 online resource (xx, 347 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s)
300   $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
311   $a0-521-78173-6 
311   $a0-511-01444-9 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 330-340) and indexes.
327   $aCover; Half-title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Figures; Preface; 1 Assumptions, distinctions, and a map; 2 Perspectival, subjective, and worldly facts; 3 Explanatory gaps and qualia; 4 Naturalisation and narrow content; 5 First-order representationalism; 6 Against first-order representationalism; 7 Higher-order representationalism: a first defence; 8 Dispositionalist higher-order thought theory (1): function; 9 Dispositionalist higher-order thought theory (2): feel; 10 Phenomenal consciousness and language; 11 Fragmentary consciousness and the Cartesian theatre; Conclusion
327   $aReferencesAuthor index; Subject index
330   $aHow can phenomenal consciousness exist as an integral part of a physical universe? How can the technicolour phenomenology of our inner lives be created out of the complex neural activities of our brains? Many have despaired of finding answers to these questions; and many have claimed that human consciousness is inherently mysterious. Peter Carruthers argues, on the contrary, that the subjective feel of our experience is fully explicable in naturalistic (scientifically acceptable) terms. Drawing on a variety of interdisciplinary resources, he develops and defends a novel account in terms of higher-order thought. He shows that this can explain away some of the more extravagant claims made about phenomenal consciousness, while substantively explaining the key subjectivity of our experience. Written with characteristic clarity and directness, and surveying a wide range of extant theories, this book is essential reading for all those within philosophy and psychology interested in the problem of consciousness.
606   $aConsciousness
606   $aNaturalism
615  0$aConsciousness.
615  0$aNaturalism.
676   $a126
700   $aCarruthers$b Peter$f1952-$0223518
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906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910780094003321
996   $aPhenomenal consciousness$93776927
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