LEADER 04662nam 22006972 450 001 9910779989003321 005 20151005020622.0 010 $a1-139-88846-3 010 $a1-107-24122-7 010 $a1-107-25083-8 010 $a1-107-52172-6 010 $a1-107-25000-5 010 $a1-107-24834-5 010 $a1-107-24751-9 010 $a0-511-99855-4 010 $a1-107-24917-1 035 $a(CKB)2550000001108168 035 $a(EBL)1303618 035 $a(OCoLC)847521062 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000890249 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11932421 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000890249 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10887218 035 $a(PQKB)10562049 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9780511998553 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1303618 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1303618 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10740468 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL508511 035 $a(PPN)192275100 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000001108168 100 $a20110114d2013|||| uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aNatural categories and human kinds $eclassification in the natural and social sciences /$fMuhammad Ali Khalidi$b[electronic resource] 210 1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2013. 215 $a1 online resource (xvi, 250 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). 311 $a1-107-01274-0 311 $a1-299-77260-9 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aContents; Figures; Preface; Chapter 1 Metaphysical Realism and essentialism about kinds; 1.1 Kinds of things; 1.2 Kinds and universals; 1.3 Kinds and essences; 1.4 Definability; 1.5 Modal necessity; 1.6 Intrinsicality; 1.7 Microstructure; 1.8 Conclusion; Chapter 2 The naturalness of kinds; 2.1 Natural kinds and epistemic kinds; 2.2 Discoverability by science; 2.3 Scientific kinds and folk categories; 2.4 Fuzzy kinds; 2.5 Crosscutting kinds; 2.6 HPC kinds and causal kinds; 2.7 Conclusion; Chapter 3 Kinds in the special sciences; 3.1 Which sciences are special? 327 $a3.2 Multiple realizability and special-science kinds3.3 Causation and special-science kinds; 3.4 Natural laws and special-science kinds; 3.5 Real causal patterns; 3.6 Levels of explanation and crosscutting kinds; 3.7 Conclusion; Chapter 4 Kinds in the biological and social sciences; 4.1 Biological and social kinds; 4.2 Selected kinds and designed kinds; 4.3 Etiological kinds; 4.4 Historical kinds or copied kinds; 4.5 Mind-dependent and interactive kinds; 4.6 Institutional and conventional kinds; 4.7 Normative kinds or evaluative kinds; 4.8 Conclusion; Chapter 5 Kinds of natural kinds 327 $a5.1 Introduction5.2 Lithium; 5.3 Polymer; 5.4 Virus; 5.5 Cancer and cancer cell; 5.6 Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD); 5.7 Conclusion; Chapter 6 Kinds naturalized; 6.1 Naturalism about kinds; 6.2 Properties and kinds; 6.3 Causality and kinds; 6.4 Realism and pluralism; 6.5 Mind-independence and social constructionism; 6.6 Conclusion; Bibliography; Index 330 $aThe notion of 'natural kinds' has been central to contemporary discussions of metaphysics and philosophy of science. Although explicitly articulated by nineteenth-century philosophers like Mill, Whewell and Venn, it has a much older history dating back to Plato and Aristotle. In recent years, essentialism has been the dominant account of natural kinds among philosophers, but the essentialist view has encountered resistance, especially among naturalist metaphysicians and philosophers of science. Informed by detailed examination of classification in the natural and social sciences, this book argues against essentialism and for a naturalist account of natural kinds. By looking at case studies drawn from diverse scientific disciplines, from fluid mechanics to virology and polymer science to psychiatry, the author argues that natural kinds are nodes in causal networks. On the basis of this account, he maintains that there can be natural kinds in the social sciences as well as the natural sciences. 517 3 $aNatural Categories & Human Kinds 606 $aCategories (Philosophy) 606 $aClassification 615 0$aCategories (Philosophy) 615 0$aClassification. 676 $a001.01/2 700 $aKhalidi$b Muhammad Ali$c(Professor),$01580377 801 0$bUkCbUP 801 1$bUkCbUP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910779989003321 996 $aNatural categories and human kinds$93861266 997 $aUNINA