LEADER 03420nam 2200685 a 450 001 9910779867603321 005 20230725061547.0 010 $a3-11-032262-5 024 7 $a10.1515/9783110322620 035 $a(CKB)2550000001097105 035 $a(EBL)1215561 035 $a(OCoLC)851972109 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000801344 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11460301 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000801344 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10773549 035 $a(PQKB)11664093 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1215561 035 $a(DE-B1597)210976 035 $a(OCoLC)853238569 035 $a(OCoLC)978667319 035 $a(DE-B1597)9783110322620 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1215561 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10728773 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL503639 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000001097105 100 $a20130717d2011 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aFrom psychology to neuroscience$b[electronic resource] $ea new reductive account /$fPatrice Soom 210 $aFrankfurt ;$aNew Brunswick $cOntos Verlag$d2011 215 $a1 online resource (322 p.) 225 1 $aEpistemische Studien : Schriften zur Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie ;$vBd. 21 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a3-11-032225-0 311 $a1-299-72388-8 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $t Frontmatter -- $tTABLE OF CONTENTS -- $tACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- $t1. INTRODUCTION -- $t2. THE PROBLEM OF MENTAL CAUSATION -- $t3. ONTOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM -- $t4. PSYCHOLOGY AND NEUROSCIENCE -- $t5. EPISTEMOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM -- $t6. REDUCTION BY MEANS OF FUNCTIONAL SUB-TYPES -- $t7. REDUCTION OF PSYCHOLOGY TO NEUROSCIENCE: CASES STUDIES -- $t8. FINAL REMARKS -- $tBIBLIOGRAPHY -- $tINDEX 330 $aThis book explores the mind-body issue from both the perspectives of philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. Starting from the problem of mental causation, it provides an overview of the contemporary metaphysical discussion and argues in favour of the token-identity thesis, as the only position that can account for the causal efficacy of the mental. Showing furthermore that this ontological reductionism is not dissociable from epistemological reductionism, the author applies a new strategy of inter-theoretic reduction, which is compatible with the multiple realizability of mental properties. Using functionally defined sub-types, this account establishes a conservative reduction of psychology to neuroscience, which vindicates both the scientific legitimacy and the theoretical indispensability of psychology. This account is illustrated by several empirical examples borrowed from contemporary neuroscience. 410 0$aEpistemische Studien (Frankfurt am Main, Germany) ;$vBd. 21. 606 $aMind and body 606 $aPhilosophy of mind 606 $aPsychology$xPhilosophy 606 $aNeurosciences$xPhilosophy 615 0$aMind and body. 615 0$aPhilosophy of mind. 615 0$aPsychology$xPhilosophy. 615 0$aNeurosciences$xPhilosophy. 676 $a158.1 700 $aSoom$b Patrice$01542492 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910779867603321 996 $aFrom psychology to neuroscience$93795283 997 $aUNINA