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100   $a20130717d2010      uy             0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aIs truth the primary epistemic goal?$b[electronic resource] /$fMarkus Patrick Hess
210   $aFrankfurt $cOntos Verlag$d2010
215   $a1 online resource (169 p.)
225 1 $aEpistemische Studien : Schriften zue Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie ;$vBd. 17
300   $aDescription based upon print version of record.
311   $a3-11-032938-7 
311   $a1-299-72308-X 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references.
327   $t Frontmatter -- $tTable of Contents -- $tAcknowledgments: -- $t1. Introduction -- $t2. Can Truth Be an Epistemic Goal? -- $t3. The Value of Truth -- $t4. Requirements of the Truth Goal -- $t5. The Primacy of the Truth Goal -- $t6. Alternative Monism -- $t7. The Value of Knowledge -- $t8. Conclusion -- $t9. Appendix: Overcoming the Problem of Epistemic Relativism -- $tBibliography
330   $aThis book is focused on a problem that has aroused the most controversy in recent epistemological debate, which is whether the truth can or cannot be the fundamental epistemic goal. Traditional epistemology has presupposed the centrality of truth without giving a deeper analysis. To epistemic value pluralists, the claim that truth is the fundamental value seems unjustified. Their central judgement is that we can be in a situation where we do not attain truth but something else that is also epistemically valuable. In contrast, epistemic value monists are committed to the view that one can only 
410  0$aEpistemische Studien (Frankfurt am Main, Germany) ;$vBd. 17.
606   $aTruth$xPhilosophy
606   $aKnowledge, Theory of
606   $aGoal (Philosophy)
615  0$aTruth$xPhilosophy.
615  0$aKnowledge, Theory of.
615  0$aGoal (Philosophy)
676   $a100
700   $aHess$b Markus Patrick$01499422
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910779734203321
996   $aIs truth the primary epistemic goal$93725440
997   $aUNINA