LEADER 03228nam 2200649 a 450 001 9910779733603321 005 20230721010850.0 010 $a3-11-032715-5 024 7 $a10.1515/9783110327151 035 $a(CKB)2550000001097033 035 $a(EBL)1195491 035 $a(OCoLC)851970818 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000801461 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11431388 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000801461 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10774516 035 $a(PQKB)10779089 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1195491 035 $a(DE-B1597)211614 035 $a(OCoLC)852656961 035 $a(OCoLC)853241192 035 $a(DE-B1597)9783110327151 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1195491 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10728800 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL503567 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000001097033 100 $a20130717d2008 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aMind$b[electronic resource] $eontology and explanation : collected papers 1981-2005 /$fLaird Addis 210 $aFrankfurt $cOntos Verlag$d2008 215 $a1 online resource (298 p.) 225 0 $aPhilosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis ;$v25 225 0$aPhilosophische Analyse ;$vBd. 25 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a3-11-032672-8 311 $a1-299-72316-0 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $t Frontmatter -- $tCONTENTS -- $tINTRODUCTION -- $tONTOLOGY -- $tMIND, STRUCTURE, AND TIME -- $tNATURAL SIGNS -- $tPAINS AND OTHER SECONDARY MENTAL ENTITIES -- $tINTRINSIC REFERENCE AND THE NEW THEORY -- $tTHE ONTOLOGY OF EMOTION -- $tTHE SIMPLICITY OF CONTENT -- $tTHE NECESSITY AND NATURE OF MENTAL CONTENT -- $tEXPLANATION -- $tDISPOSITIONS, EXPLANATION, AND BEHAVIOR -- $tBEHAVIORISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACT -- $tPARALLELISM, INTERACTIONISM, AND CAUSATION -- $tDISPOSITIONAL MENTAL STATES: CHOMSKY AND FREUD -- $tREVIEW OF LAURENCE D. SMITH'S BEHAVIORISM AND LOGICAL POSITIVISM: A REASSESSMENT OF THE ALLIANCE -- $tHUMAN ACTION AND THE HUMEAN UNIVERSE -- $tREFERENCES -- $tAUTHOR'S NOTE -- $tINDEX OF NAMES -- $t Backmatter 330 $aIn this collection of papers by Laird Addis, published over approximately a quarter century, the main topics are the ontology of mind and the role of mind in the explanation of behavior. Addis defends a theory of natural signs, by which there is, in every conscious state including emotional states, an intrinsically intentional entity. He also argues that explanations of behavior by dispositional mental states, while not themselves causal explanations, presuppose the possibility of such explanations. The theory of dispositions is applied also to the theories of Chomsky and Freud. In broad stroke 410 0$aPhilosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis 606 $aPhilosophy of mind 606 $aOntology 615 0$aPhilosophy of mind. 615 0$aOntology. 676 $a110 700 $aAddis$b Laird$0862825 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910779733603321 996 $aMind$93725434 997 $aUNINA