LEADER 01481nam1 22003251i 450 001 990003002190403321 005 20070619135629.0 035 $a000300219 035 $aFED01000300219 035 $a(Aleph)000300219FED01 035 $a000300219 100 $a20030910d1994----km-y0itay50------ba 101 0 $aeng 102 $aIT 200 1 $aCentral Bank Independence and Accountability$eopen issues and institutional reforms$eproceedings of a conference held on March 4th, 1994 at Bocconi University$fedited by Franco Bruni 210 $aMilano$cUniversità commerciale Luigi Bocconi. Centro di economia monetaria e finanziaria Paolo Baffi$d1994 215 $a6 v. 300 $ain contenitore 463 \1$1001990003025410403321$12001 $aCentral Bank Constitutions for federal Monetary Unions 463 \1$1001990003025450403321$12001 $aConference on Central Bank Independence and Accountability$eSynthesis 463 \1$1001990003025540403321$12001 $aCentral Banking, Seigniorage and the Financing of the Government 463 \1$1001990003039550403321$12001 $aCredibility and Accountability in Monetary Policy 463 \1$1001990007935130403321$12001 $aCentral bank independence in New Zealand$eanalytical, empirical and institutional aspects 702 1$aBruni,$bFranco$f<1948- > 801 0$aIT$bUNINA$gRICA$2UNIMARC 901 $aBK 912 $a990003002190403321 959 $aSES 996 $aCentral Bank Independence and Accountability$9468632 997 $aUNINA LEADER 05724oam 22011294 450 001 9910779500803321 005 20230802005524.0 010 $a1-4755-2871-X 010 $a1-4755-5692-6 035 $a(CKB)2550000000107541 035 $a(EBL)1606783 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000944125 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11528599 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000944125 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10982502 035 $a(PQKB)11701009 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1606783 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1606783 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10579627 035 $a(OCoLC)794992334 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2012150 035 $a(IMF)WPIEA2012150 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000107541 100 $a20020129d2012 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aWhat Determines Government Spending Multipliers? /$fGernot Müller, Andre Meier, Giancarlo Corsetti 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2012. 215 $a1 online resource (47 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4755-0444-6 311 $a1-4755-0421-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aCover; 1 Introduction; 2 Fiscal policy in different economic environments; 2.1 A theoretical benchmark; 2.2 Pegged exchange rates; 2.3 Weak public finances; 2.4 Financial crises; 3 Empirical strategy; 3.1 Identification issues; 3.2 The first step: Identifying government spending shocks; 3.3 The second step: Tracing the effects of government spending in different economic environments; 3.4 The data; 4 Systematic and non-systematic changes in government spending; 5 The effects of government spending shocks; 5.1 Unconditional effects; 5.2 Accounting for the economic environment 327 $a5.3 Sensitivity analysis6 Conclusion; References; Tables; Table 1. Composition of Initial and Final Samples; Table 2. Data Sources and Definitions; Table 3. Results of First-Step Regression; Table 4. Summary Statistics for Estimated Government Spending Shocks; Table 5. Overview of Dummy Characteristics; Figure 5: Results for narrow definition of financial crisis; Figure 6: Results for alternative definition of weak public finances (government debt > 120 percent of GDP and/or lagged net borrowing > 7 percent of GDP); Figure 7: Results for difference specification 327 $aFigure 8: Results for first-step specification which includes contemporaneous value of crisis dummyFigure 9: Results without CLI in first step; Figure 10: Results for sample without 2007-2008; Figure 11: Results for sample without United States 330 3 $aThis paper studies how the effects of government spending vary with the economic environment. Using a panel of OECD countries, we identify fiscal shocks as residuals from an estimated spending rule and trace their macroeconomic impact under different conditions regarding the exchange rate regime, public indebtedness, and health of the financial system. The unconditional responses to a positive spending shock broadly confirm earlier findings. However, conditional responses differ systematically across exchange rate regimes, as real appreciation and external deficits occur mainly under currency pegs. We also find output and consumption multipliers to be unusually high during times of financial crisis. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2012/150 606 $aMultiplier (Economics) 606 $aMonetary policy 606 $aFinancial Risk Management$2imf 606 $aForeign Exchange$2imf 606 $aPublic Finance$2imf 606 $aFiscal Policy$2imf 606 $aComparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy$2imf 606 $aStabilization$2imf 606 $aTreasury Policy$2imf 606 $aOpen Economy Macroeconomics$2imf 606 $aNational Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General$2imf 606 $aFinancial Crises$2imf 606 $aPublic finance & taxation$2imf 606 $aCurrency$2imf 606 $aForeign exchange$2imf 606 $aMacroeconomics$2imf 606 $aEconomic & financial crises & disasters$2imf 606 $aExpenditure$2imf 606 $aFiscal policy$2imf 606 $aFinancial crises$2imf 606 $aExchange rate arrangements$2imf 606 $aReal exchange rates$2imf 606 $aExpenditures, Public$2imf 607 $aUnited States$2imf 615 0$aMultiplier (Economics) 615 0$aMonetary policy. 615 7$aFinancial Risk Management 615 7$aForeign Exchange 615 7$aPublic Finance 615 7$aFiscal Policy 615 7$aComparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy 615 7$aStabilization 615 7$aTreasury Policy 615 7$aOpen Economy Macroeconomics 615 7$aNational Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General 615 7$aFinancial Crises 615 7$aPublic finance & taxation 615 7$aCurrency 615 7$aForeign exchange 615 7$aMacroeconomics 615 7$aEconomic & financial crises & disasters 615 7$aExpenditure 615 7$aFiscal policy 615 7$aFinancial crises 615 7$aExchange rate arrangements 615 7$aReal exchange rates 615 7$aExpenditures, Public 700 $aMüller$b Gernot$01472690 701 $aMeier$b Andre$0862014 701 $aCorsetti$b Giancarlo$0122773 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910779500803321 996 $aWhat Determines Government Spending Multipliers$93698043 997 $aUNINA