LEADER 03740nam 2200613Ia 450 001 9910779266203321 005 20230802005254.0 010 $a1-280-77218-2 010 $a9786613682956 010 $a0-300-18353-4 024 7 $a10.12987/9780300183535 035 $a(CKB)2550000000104180 035 $a(StDuBDS)AH24071028 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000687531 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11451129 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000687531 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10756162 035 $a(PQKB)10651831 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3420881 035 $a(DE-B1597)485908 035 $a(OCoLC)828617184 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780300183535 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3420881 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10571007 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL368295 035 $a(OCoLC)923598660 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000104180 100 $a20111208d2012 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe bride and the dowry$b[electronic resource] $eIsrael, Jordan, and the Palestinians in the aftermath of the June 1967 War /$fAvi Raz 210 $aNew Haven $cYale University Press$d2012 215 $a1 online resource (xxxiii, 438 p. )$cmaps 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a0-300-17194-3 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFront matter --$tContents --$tMaps --$tPrologue. Two Peoples, One Land --$tPreface --$tDramatis Personae --$tAbbreviations --$tIntroduction --$tOne. The Two Options: 5 June- Early July 1967 --$tTwo. The Jerusalem Syndrome: Late June- July 1967 --$tThree. In Search of Docile Leadership: July- September 1967 --$tFour. The Right of No Return: June- September 1967 --$tFive. An Entity versus a King: September- November 1967 --$tSix. A One- Way Dialogue: December 1967- January 1968 --$tSeven. Go- Betweens: February- Early May 1968 --$tEight. The Double Game Redoubled: Mid- May-October 1968 --$tNine. "The Whole World Is Against Us": Epilogue --$tNotes --$tSources and Bibliography --$tIndex 330 $aIsrael's victory in the June 1967 Six Day War provided a unique opportunity for resolving the decades-old Arab-Zionist conflict. Having seized the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights, Israel for the first time in its history had something concrete to offer its Arab neighbors: it could trade land for peace. Yet the political deadlock persisted after the guns fell silent. This book sets out to find out why.Avi Raz places Israel's conduct under an uncompromising lens. He meticulously examines the critical two years following the June war and substantially revises our understanding of how and why Israeli-Arab secret contacts came to naught. Mining newly declassified records in Israeli, American, British, and UN archives, as well as private papers of individual participants, Raz dispels the myth of overall Arab intransigence and arrives at new and unexpected conclusions. In short, he concludes that Israel's postwar diplomacy was deliberately ineffective because its leaders preferred land over peace with its neighbors. The book throws a great deal of light not only on the post-1967 period but also on the problems and pitfalls of peacemaking in the Middle East today. 606 $aArab-Israeli conflict$y1967-1973 606 $aIsrael-Arab War, 1967 615 0$aArab-Israeli conflict 615 0$aIsrael-Arab War, 1967. 676 $a956.046 700 $aRaz$b Avi$0478755 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910779266203321 996 $aThe bride and the dowry$93842827 997 $aUNINA