LEADER 05838oam 22013694 450 001 9910779220703321 005 20230802005401.0 010 $a1-4755-1163-9 010 $a1-4755-8117-3 035 $a(CKB)2550000000106127 035 $a(EBL)1606696 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001101020 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11609134 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001101020 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11063694 035 $a(PQKB)11497081 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1606696 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1606696 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10566297 035 $a(OCoLC)870244824 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2012101 035 $a(IMF)WPIEA2012101 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000106127 100 $a20020129d2012 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aCentral Bank Independence and Macro-Prudential Regulation /$fFabian Valencia, Kenichi Ueda 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2012. 215 $a1 online resource (28 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 225 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/12/101 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4755-4968-7 311 $a1-4755-0291-5 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aCover; Contents; I: Introduction; II: Model Setup; III: Social Planner Benchmark; IV: Time inconsistency in a dual-mandate central bank; V: Separation of Objectives Achieves Social Optimum; VI: The role of political independence; A: Non-Independent Central Bank and Independent Macro-prudential Regulator; B: Non-Independent Macro-prudential Regulator and Independent Central Bank; VII: Welfare Comparisons; List of Tables; 1 Welfare Loss Across Institutional Arrangements; VIII: Conclusions; References; Appendices; I: Non-Independent Single Authority; II: Distortionary Macro-prudential Regulation 330 3 $aWe consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially optimal level of inflation. Ex-post, however, the central bank chooses inflation above the social optimum to reduce the real value of private debt. This inefficient outcome arises when macro-prudential policies cannot be adjusted as frequently as monetary. Importantly, this result arises even when the central bank is politically independent. We then consider the role of political pressures in the spirit of Barro and Gordon (1983). We show that if either the macro-prudential regulator or the central bank (or both) are not politically independent, separation of price and financial stability objectives does not deliver the social optimum. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2012/101 606 $aBanks and banking, Central 606 $aBanks and banking 606 $aBanks and Banking$2imf 606 $aFinance: General$2imf 606 $aInflation$2imf 606 $aMacroeconomics$2imf 606 $aMoney and Monetary Policy$2imf 606 $aOptimization Techniques$2imf 606 $aProgramming Models$2imf 606 $aDynamic Analysis$2imf 606 $aMacroeconomics: Consumption$2imf 606 $aSaving$2imf 606 $aWealth$2imf 606 $aContingent Pricing$2imf 606 $aFutures Pricing$2imf 606 $aoption pricing$2imf 606 $aPrice Level$2imf 606 $aDeflation$2imf 606 $aBanks$2imf 606 $aDepository Institutions$2imf 606 $aMicro Finance Institutions$2imf 606 $aMortgages$2imf 606 $aGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation$2imf 606 $aMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General$2imf 606 $aBanking$2imf 606 $aFinance$2imf 606 $aMonetary economics$2imf 606 $aPrice stabilization$2imf 606 $aFinancial sector stability$2imf 606 $aCredit$2imf 606 $aPrices$2imf 606 $aBanks and banking$2imf 606 $aGovernment policy$2imf 606 $aFinancial services industry$2imf 615 0$aBanks and banking, Central. 615 0$aBanks and banking. 615 7$aBanks and Banking 615 7$aFinance: General 615 7$aInflation 615 7$aMacroeconomics 615 7$aMoney and Monetary Policy 615 7$aOptimization Techniques 615 7$aProgramming Models 615 7$aDynamic Analysis 615 7$aMacroeconomics: Consumption 615 7$aSaving 615 7$aWealth 615 7$aContingent Pricing 615 7$aFutures Pricing 615 7$aoption pricing 615 7$aPrice Level 615 7$aDeflation 615 7$aBanks 615 7$aDepository Institutions 615 7$aMicro Finance Institutions 615 7$aMortgages 615 7$aGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation 615 7$aMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General 615 7$aBanking 615 7$aFinance 615 7$aMonetary economics 615 7$aPrice stabilization 615 7$aFinancial sector stability 615 7$aCredit 615 7$aPrices 615 7$aBanks and banking 615 7$aGovernment policy 615 7$aFinancial services industry 700 $aValencia$b Fabian$01493480 701 $aUeda$b Kenichi$01485191 712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund. 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910779220703321 996 $aCentral Bank Independence and Macro-Prudential Regulation$93762895 997 $aUNINA