LEADER 04610nam 2200961 a 450 001 9910779185003321 005 20230126202920.0 010 $a1-283-53985-3 010 $a9786613852304 010 $a1-4008-4243-3 024 7 $a10.1515/9781400842438 035 $a(CKB)2550000000100568 035 $a(EBL)920558 035 $a(OCoLC)794670871 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000693672 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11405898 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000693672 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10652141 035 $a(PQKB)10525175 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC920558 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0000406924 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse37155 035 $a(DE-B1597)447409 035 $a(OCoLC)979582931 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781400842438 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL920558 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10561987 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL385230 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000100568 100 $a20111201d2012 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aTalk at the brink$b[electronic resource] $edeliberation and decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis /$fDavid R. Gibson 205 $aCore Textbook 210 $aPrinceton $cPrinceton University Press$d[2012] 215 $a1 online resource (235 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-691-15131-8 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aIntroduction: talk in time of crisis -- The future in thought and talk -- The ExComm -- The response -- The blockade -- The deal -- Conclusion. 330 $aIn October 1962, the fate of the world hung on the American response to the discovery of Soviet nuclear missile sites in Cuba. That response was informed by hours of discussions between John F. Kennedy and his top advisers. What those advisers did not know was that President Kennedy was secretly taping their talks, providing future scholars with a rare inside look at high-level political deliberation in a moment of crisis. Talk at the Brink is the first book to examine these historic audio recordings from a sociological perspective. It reveals how conversational practices and dynamics shaped Kennedy's perception of the options available to him, thereby influencing his decisions and ultimately the outcome of the crisis. David Gibson looks not just at the positions taken by Kennedy and his advisers but how those positions were articulated, challenged, revised, and sometimes ignored. He argues that Kennedy's decisions arose from the intersection of distant events unfolding in Cuba, Moscow, and the high seas with the immediate conversational minutia of turn-taking, storytelling, argument, and justification. In particular, Gibson shows how Kennedy's group told and retold particular stories again and again, sometimes settling upon a course of action only after the most frightening consequences were omitted or actively suppressed. Talk at the Brink presents an image of Kennedy's response to the Cuban missile crisis that is sharply at odds with previous scholarship, and has important implications for our understanding of decision making, deliberation, social interaction, and historical contingency. 606 $aCuban Missile Crisis, 1962 606 $aSocial interaction$zUnited States$vCase studies 606 $aDecision making$zUnited States$vCase studies 610 $aBay of Pigs. 610 $aCuba. 610 $aCuban missile crisis. 610 $aExComm. 610 $aExecutive Committee of the National Security Council. 610 $aJohn F. Kennedy. 610 $aKhrushchev. 610 $aSoviet missiles. 610 $aWhite House meetings. 610 $ablockade. 610 $achoice. 610 $acollaborative narration. 610 $acrisis talks. 610 $adecision making. 610 $adecision-making process. 610 $adeliberation. 610 $afuture. 610 $alinguistic expression. 610 $anarrative relevance. 610 $anuclear missiles. 610 $asecret recordings. 610 $asocial interaction. 610 $asuppression. 610 $atelephone conversation. 615 0$aCuban Missile Crisis, 1962. 615 0$aSocial interaction 615 0$aDecision making 676 $a972.9106/4 700 $aGibson$b David R.$f1969-$01574765 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910779185003321 996 $aTalk at the brink$93851197 997 $aUNINA