LEADER 06626oam 2200733Ia 450 001 9910779176703321 005 20190503073403.0 010 $a0-262-30073-7 010 $a1-280-49893-5 010 $a9786613594167 010 $a0-262-30150-4 035 $a(CKB)2550000000101033 035 $a(EBL)3339441 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000655560 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12242719 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000655560 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10614584 035 $a(PQKB)10503872 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3339441 035 $a(OCoLC)793206751$z(OCoLC)817078629$z(OCoLC)871896806$z(OCoLC)961508192$z(OCoLC)962596319$z(OCoLC)965974506$z(OCoLC)992115284$z(OCoLC)1037908143$z(OCoLC)1038699646$z(OCoLC)1045523948$z(OCoLC)1065876678$z(OCoLC)1081221140 035 $a(OCoLC-P)793206751 035 $a(MaCbMITP)9011 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3339441 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10558468 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL359416 035 $a(OCoLC)794545732 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000101033 100 $a20120507d2012 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe economics of collusion $ecartels and bidding rings /$fRobert C. Marshall and Leslie M. Marx 210 $aCambridge, Mass. $cMIT Press$dİ2012 215 $a1 online resource (315 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-262-52594-1 311 $a0-262-01732-6 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and indexes. 327 $a""Contents""; ""Preface""; ""Chapter 1. Introduction ""; ""1.1 Motivating Example""; ""1.2 Collusion within Portera???s Five Forces""; ""1.3 Difficulties of Collusion""; ""1.4 Environments Requiring Explicit Collusion""; ""1.5 Lingering Price Effects of Explicit Collusion""; ""1.6 Price Formation Process""; ""1.7 Economic Rationale for the Illegality of Explicit Collusion""; ""1.8 Cartel Detection""; ""1.9 Outline of the Book""; ""1.10 Appendix: Factors Affecting the Sustainability of Tacit Collusion""; ""Part I. Collusion in Practice""; ""Chapter 2. Narrative of a Cartel"" 327 $a""2.1 The Story Begins""""2.2 Initiation of the Cartel""; ""2.3 Market Share Division""; ""2.4 Price Increases and Announcements""; ""2.5 Sales Force Issues""; ""2.6 Redistributions""; ""2.7 Questions and Answers""; ""Chapter 3. Narrative of a Bidding Ring""; ""3.1 Preamble""; ""3.2 The Instruction Begins""; ""3.3 Two Motivations for the Ring""; ""3.4 Ring Logistics""; ""3.5 Ring Membership""; ""3.6 Auctioneera???s Response""; ""3.7 Implementation of Sidepayments""; ""3.8 Questions and Answers""; ""Chapter 4. Narrative of Cartel Detection""; ""4.1 Preamble""; ""4.2 The Seminar Begins"" 327 $a""4.3 Taxonomy of Cartel Actions""""4.4 Economic Evidence of Collusion""; ""4.5 Questions and Answers""; ""Part II. Economics of Cartels""; ""Chapter 5. Suppression of Rivalry by Cartels""; ""5.1 Basics""; ""5.2 Buyer Resistance""; ""5.3 Model of Price Competition without Buyer Resistance""; ""5.4 Collusive Outcomes""; ""5.5 Incentives for Cheating""; ""5.6 Conclusion""; ""Chapter 6. Implementation of Collusion by Cartels""; ""6.1 The Central Cartel Problem and the Solution""; ""6.2 Pricing Structures""; ""6.3 Allocation Structures""; ""6.4 Enforcement Structures""; ""6.5 Conclusion"" 327 $a""6.6 Appendix: Third-Party Facilitation""""Chapter 7. Beyond the Suppression of Within-cartel Rivalry""; ""7.1 Sharing Mutually Beneficial Investments""; ""7.2 A Dominant Firm versus a Cartel Acting as a Dominant Firm""; ""7.3 Direct Actions against Noncartel Firms""; ""7.4 Perimeter Forces""; ""7.5 Sixth Force of Government""; ""7.6 Conclusion""; ""7.7 Appendix: Antitrust Exemptions""; ""Part III. Economics of Bidding Rings""; ""Chapter 8. Suppression of Interbidder Rivalry by Rings""; ""8.1 Role of Auctions and Procurements in Price Discovery""; ""8.2 Suppression of Rivalry at an Auction"" 327 $a""8.3 Ring Composition""""8.4 Effects of Auction Format and Ring Size""; ""8.5 Conclusion""; ""8.6 Appendix A: Numerical Example of Leakage at a Sealed-Bid Auction""; ""8.7 Appendix B: Numerical Example of Membership and Participation at a Sealed-Bid Auction""; ""Chapter 9. Implementation of Collusion by Rings""; ""9.1 Rings versus Cartels""; ""9.2 Ring Secret Deviations""; ""9.3 Ring Pricing Structures and Seller Resistance""; ""9.4 Ring Allocation Structures""; ""9.5 Ring Enforcement Structures""; ""9.6 Ring Mechanisms for Standard Auction Types""; ""9.7 Efficiency of Allocations"" 327 $a""9.8 Conclusion"" 330 8 $aExplicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on interfirm communication and/or transfers. Rivalry between competitors erodes profits; the suppression of rivalry through collusion is one avenue by which firms can enhance profits. Many cartels and bidding rings function for years in a stable and peaceful manner despite the illegality of their agreements and incentives for deviation by their members. In The Economics of Collusion, Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx offer an examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Marshall and Marx, who have studied collusion extensively for two decades, begin with three narratives: the organization and implementation of a cartel, the organization and implementation of a bidding ring, and a parent company's efforts to detect collusion by its divisions. These accounts--fictitious, but rooted in the inner workings and details from actual cases--offer a novel and engaging way for the reader to understand the basics of collusive behavior. The narratives are followed by detailed economic analyses of cartels, bidding rings, and detection. The narratives offer an engaging entree to the more rigorous economic discussion that follows. The book is accessible to any reader who understands basic economic reasoning. Mathematical material is flagged with asterisks. 606 $aPrice fixing 606 $aCartels 606 $aCompetition 610 $aECONOMICS/Microeconomics 610 $aSOCIAL SCIENCES/Political Science/Public Policy & Law 615 0$aPrice fixing. 615 0$aCartels. 615 0$aCompetition. 676 $a338.8/2 700 $aMarshall$b Robert C.$f1956-$0741046 702 $aMarx$b Leslie M.$f1967- 801 0$bOCoLC-P 801 1$bOCoLC-P 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910779176703321 996 $aThe economics of collusion$93824418 997 $aUNINA