LEADER 03490nam 22006612 450 001 9910778586903321 005 20230712234823.0 010 $a1-107-19406-7 010 $a9786612393846 010 $a1-282-39384-7 010 $a0-511-64780-8 010 $a0-511-80852-6 010 $a0-511-63276-2 010 $a0-511-65188-0 010 $a0-511-63155-3 010 $a0-511-63396-3 035 $a(CKB)1000000000804246 035 $a(EBL)461114 035 $a(OCoLC)609845669 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000338936 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11234121 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000338936 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10299331 035 $a(PQKB)11749735 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9780511808524 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC461114 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL461114 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10349750 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL239384 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000804246 100 $a20141103d2009|||| uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aImperfect union $erepresentation and taxation in multilevel governments /$fChristopher R. Berry 210 1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2009. 215 $a1 online resource (xiii, 255 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 225 1 $aPolitical economy of institutions and decisions 311 0 $a0-521-75835-1 311 0 $a0-521-76473-4 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aCover; Half-title; Dedication; Series-title; Title; Copyright; Contents; Preface; Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction: American Politics in 3D; 2 What's Special about Special-Purpose Governments?; 3 A Political Theory of Special-Purpose Government; 4 Piling On: The Problem of Concurrent Taxation; 5 Specialization and Quality; 6 Governing the Fiscal Commons; 7 Conclusion; Methodological Appendix; References; Index 330 $aImperfect Union offers the first political theory of special purpose jurisdictions, which constitute the most common form of local government in the United States today. Collectively, special purpose governments have more civilian employees than the federal government and spend more than all city governments combined. The proliferation of special purpose jurisdictions has fundamentally altered the nature of representation and taxation in local government. Citizens today are commonly represented by dozens - in some cases hundreds - of local officials in multiple layers of government. As a result, political participation in local elections is low and special interest groups associated with each function exert disproportionate influence. With multiple special-interest governments tapping the same tax base, the local tax base takes on the character of a common-pool resource, leading to familiar problems of overexploitation. Strong political parties can often mitigate the common-pool problem by informally coordinating the policies of multiple overlapping governments. 410 0$aPolitical economy of institutions and decisions. 606 $aSpecial districts$zUnited States 606 $aLocal finance$zUnited States 615 0$aSpecial districts 615 0$aLocal finance 676 $a352.4/2190973 700 $aBerry$b Christopher R.$0148826 801 0$bUkCbUP 801 1$bUkCbUP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910778586903321 996 $aImperfect union$93802872 997 $aUNINA