LEADER 03287nam 22006492 450 001 9910778400403321 005 20160418162959.0 010 $a1-107-15486-3 010 $a1-281-10863-4 010 $a9786611108632 010 $a0-511-79112-7 010 $a0-511-34498-8 010 $a0-511-34462-7 010 $a0-511-34423-6 010 $a0-511-56839-8 010 $a0-511-34532-1 035 $a(CKB)1000000000479412 035 $a(EBL)321239 035 $a(OCoLC)185082153 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000244501 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11190849 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000244501 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10168866 035 $a(PQKB)10766316 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9780511791123 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL321239 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10205249 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL110863 035 $a(OCoLC)182939091 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC321239 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000479412 100 $a20141103d2005|||| uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aSetting the agenda $eresponsible party government in the U.S. House of Representatives /$fGary W. Cox, Mathew D. McCubbins$b[electronic resource] 210 1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2005. 215 $a1 online resource (xii, 336 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). 311 $a0-521-61996-3 311 $a0-521-85379-6 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aIntroduction -- Procedural cartel theory -- Modeling agenda power -- The primacy of Reed's rules in House organization -- Final passage votes -- The costs of agenda control -- The textbook Congress and the Committee on Rules -- The bills reported from committee -- Which way does policy move? -- Positive agenda power -- Conclusion. 330 $aScholars of the U.S. House disagree over the importance of political parties in organizing the legislative process. On the one hand, non-partisan theories stress how congressional organization serves members' non-partisan goals. On the other hand, partisan theories argue that the House is organized to serve the collective interests of the majority party. This book advances our partisan theory and presents a series of empirical tests of that theory's predictions (pitted against others). It considers why procedural cartels form, arguing that agenda power is naturally subject to cartelization in busy legislatures. It argues that the majority party has cartelized agenda power in the U.S. House since the adoption of Reed's rules in 1890. The evidence demonstrates that the majority party seizes agenda control at nearly every stage of the legislative process in order to prevent bills that the party dislikes from reaching the floor. 606 $aPolitical parties$zUnited States 615 0$aPolitical parties 676 $a328.73/072 700 $aCox$b Gary W.$0497721 702 $aMcCubbins$b Mathew D$g(Mathew Daniel),$f1956- 801 0$bUkCbUP 801 1$bUkCbUP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910778400403321 996 $aSetting the agenda$93688251 997 $aUNINA