LEADER 04205nam 2200673 a 450 001 9910778221403321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-282-15805-8 010 $a9786612158056 010 $a1-4008-3027-3 024 7 $a10.1515/9781400830275 035 $a(CKB)1000000000788474 035 $a(EBL)457948 035 $a(OCoLC)437417001 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000250235 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11239797 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000250235 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10232668 035 $a(PQKB)11454465 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse43036 035 $a(DE-B1597)453566 035 $a(OCoLC)979905197 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781400830275 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL457948 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10312466 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL215805 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC457948 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000788474 100 $a20061229d2007 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aSpying blind$b[electronic resource] $ethe CIA, the FBI, and the origins of 9/11 /$fAmy B. Zegart 205 $aCourse Book 210 $aPrinceton, N.J. $cPrinceton University Press$dc2007 215 $a1 online resource (335 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-691-12021-8 311 $a0-691-14103-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [273]-307) and index. 327 $aAn organizational view of 9/11 -- Canaries in the coal mine : the case for failed adaptation -- Crossing an academic no-man's land : explaining failed adaptation -- Fighting Osama one bureaucrat at a time : adaptation failure in the CIA -- Signals found and lost : the CIA and 9/11 -- Real men don't type : adaptation failure in the FBI -- Evidence teams at the ready : the FBI and 9/11 -- The more things change? -- Appendix A: Timeline of major events, 1991-2006 -- Appendix B: Intelligence reform catalog methodology. 330 $aIn this pathbreaking book, Amy Zegart provides the first scholarly examination of the intelligence failures that preceded September 11. Until now, those failures have been attributed largely to individual mistakes. But Zegart shows how and why the intelligence system itself left us vulnerable. Zegart argues that after the Cold War ended, the CIA and FBI failed to adapt to the rise of terrorism. She makes the case by conducting painstaking analysis of more than three hundred intelligence reform recommendations and tracing the history of CIA and FBI counterterrorism efforts from 1991 to 2001, drawing extensively from declassified government documents and interviews with more than seventy high-ranking government officials. She finds that political leaders were well aware of the emerging terrorist danger and the urgent need for intelligence reform, but failed to achieve the changes they sought. The same forces that have stymied intelligence reform for decades are to blame: resistance inside U.S. intelligence agencies, the rational interests of politicians and career bureaucrats, and core aspects of our democracy such as the fragmented structure of the federal government. Ultimately failures of adaptation led to failures of performance. Zegart reveals how longstanding organizational weaknesses left unaddressed during the 1990's prevented the CIA and FBI from capitalizing on twenty-three opportunities to disrupt the September 11 plot. Spying Blind is a sobering account of why two of America's most important intelligence agencies failed to adjust to new threats after the Cold War, and why they are unlikely to adapt in the future. 606 $aIntelligence service$zUnited States 606 $aSeptember 11 Terrorist Attacks, 2001 606 $aTerrorism$xGovernment policy$zUnited States 615 0$aIntelligence service 615 0$aSeptember 11 Terrorist Attacks, 2001. 615 0$aTerrorism$xGovernment policy 676 $a973.931 700 $aZegart$b Amy B.$f1967-$01525344 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910778221403321 996 $aSpying blind$93839337 997 $aUNINA