LEADER 04004nam 22006734a 450 001 9910778181203321 005 20230617010728.0 010 $a0-674-04051-1 024 7 $a10.4159/9780674040519 035 $a(CKB)1000000000786809 035 $a(OCoLC)607113719 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10314341 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000131067 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11135614 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000131067 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10008731 035 $a(PQKB)10586468 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3300327 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3300327 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10314341 035 $a(DE-B1597)585473 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780674040519 035 $a(OCoLC)1294426762 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000786809 100 $a20040427d2004 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aCorruption by design$b[electronic resource] $ebuilding clean government in mainland China and Hong Kong /$fMelanie Manion 210 $aCambridge, MA $cHarvard University Press$d2004 215 $a1 online resource (296 p.) 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a0-674-01486-3 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFrontmatter -- $tContents -- $tAcknowledgments -- $t1 Anticorruption Reform in a Setting ofWidespread Corruption -- $t2 Corruption and Anticorruption Reform in Hong Kong -- $t3 An Explosion of Corruption in Mainland China -- $t4 Problems of Routine Anticorruption Enforcement -- $t5 Anticorruption Campaigns as Enforcement Mechanisms -- $t6 Institutional Designs for Clean Government -- $tNotes -- $tWorks Cited -- $tAuthor Index -- $tSubject Index 330 $aThis book contrasts experiences of mainland China and Hong Kong to explore the pressing question of how governments can transform a culture of widespread corruption to one of clean government. Melanie Manion examines Hong Kong as the best example of the possibility of reform. Within a few years it achieved a spectacularly successful conversion to clean government. Mainland China illustrates the difficulty of reform. Despite more than two decades of anticorruption reform, corruption in China continues to spread essentially unabated. The book argues that where corruption is already commonplace, the context in which officials and ordinary citizens make choices to transact corruptly (or not) is crucially different from that in which corrupt practices are uncommon. A central feature of this difference is the role of beliefs about the prevalence of corruption and the reliability of government as an enforcer of rules ostensibly constraining official venality. Anticorruption reform in a setting of widespread corruption is a problem not only of reducing corrupt payoffs, but also of changing broadly shared expectations of venality. The book explores differences in institutional design choices about anticorruption agencies, appropriate incentive structures, and underlying constitutional designs that contribute to the disparate outcomes in Hong Kong and mainland China. 606 $aPolitical corruption$zChina$xPrevention 606 $aPolitical corruption$zChina$zHong Kong$xPrevention 606 $aPolitical corruption$xPrevention$vCase studies 606 $aPolitical corruption$zChina 606 $aPolitical corruption$zChina$zHong Kong 606 $aPolitical corruption$vCase studies 615 0$aPolitical corruption$xPrevention. 615 0$aPolitical corruption$xPrevention. 615 0$aPolitical corruption$xPrevention 615 0$aPolitical corruption 615 0$aPolitical corruption 615 0$aPolitical corruption 676 $a364.1/323/0951 700 $aManion$b Melanie$f1955-$01462629 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910778181203321 996 $aCorruption by design$93671671 997 $aUNINA