LEADER 03189oam 2200733Ia 450 001 9910778112303321 005 20190503073341.0 010 $a0-262-26197-9 010 $a1-282-09904-3 010 $a9786612099045 010 $a0-262-26951-1 010 $a1-4356-0314-1 024 3 $a9780262269513 035 $a(CKB)1000000000478574 035 $a(EBL)3338733 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000164151 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11924476 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000164151 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10120737 035 $a(PQKB)11029936 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3338733 035 $a(OCoLC)177222550$z(OCoLC)432428621$z(OCoLC)648325763$z(OCoLC)764480230$z(OCoLC)815776613$z(OCoLC)961522535$z(OCoLC)961855879$z(OCoLC)962623011$z(OCoLC)966103859$z(OCoLC)967618421$z(OCoLC)990382561 035 $a(OCoLC-P)177222550 035 $a(MaCbMITP)7421 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3338733 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10190478 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL209904 035 $a(OCoLC)177222550 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000478574 100 $a20071026h20082008 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aGo?del, Putnam, and functionalism $ea new reading of Representation and reality /$fJeff Buechner 210 1$aCambridge, Mass. :$cMIT Press,$d[2008] 210 4$dİ2008 215 $a1 online resource (357 p.) 300 $a"A Bradford book." 311 $a0-262-52818-5 311 $a0-262-02623-6 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aContents; Preface; Introduction; 1 Putnam's Use of Go?del's Incompleteness Theorems to Refute Computational Functionalism; 2 Putnam's Bombshell: The Go?delian Argument in ''Reflexive Reflections''; 3 Universal Realization of Computation: Putnam's Triviality Argument; 4 Putnam's Triviality Theorem and Universal Physical Computation; 5 Searle on Triviality and the Subjective Nature of Computation; 6 There Are Infinitely Many Computational Realizations of an Arbitrary Intentional State; 7 Against Local Computational Reduction: The EQUIVALENCE Argument 327 $a8 Rational Interpretation, Synonymy Determination, and EQUIVALENCE9 The Question of the Nonformalizability of SD, Coreferentiality Decisions, and the Family of Notions: Rational Interpretation1, General Intelligence, and Reasonable Reasoning; Notes; Index 330 $aThe first systematic examination of Hilary Putnam's arguments against computational functionalism challenges each of Putnam's main arguments. 606 $aRealism 606 $aFunctionalism (Psychology) 606 $aMind-brain identity theory 606 $aComputers 610 $aPHILOSOPHY/General 610 $aCOGNITIVE SCIENCES/General 615 0$aRealism. 615 0$aFunctionalism (Psychology) 615 0$aMind-brain identity theory. 615 0$aComputers. 676 $a128/.2 700 $aBuechner$b Jeff$01548936 801 0$bOCoLC-P 801 1$bOCoLC-P 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910778112303321 996 $aGo?del, Putnam, and functionalism$93806362 997 $aUNINA