LEADER 03744nam 2200685 a 450 001 9910778097103321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-282-12973-2 010 $a9786612129735 010 $a1-4008-2777-9 024 7 $a10.1515/9781400827770 035 $a(CKB)1000000000756339 035 $a(EBL)445431 035 $a(OCoLC)342572503 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000271005 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11192915 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000271005 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10280703 035 $a(PQKB)10623498 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse36395 035 $a(DE-B1597)446567 035 $a(OCoLC)979576849 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781400827770 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL445431 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10284225 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL212973 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC445431 035 $a(PPN)201952300 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000756339 100 $a20061011d2007 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|||||||nn|n 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aWhen insurers go bust$b[electronic resource] $ean economic analysis of the role and design of prudential regulation /$fGuillaume Plantin, Jean-Charles Rochet 205 $aCourse Book 210 $aPrinceton $cPrinceton University Press$d2007 215 $a1 online resource (112 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-691-17098-3 311 $a0-691-12935-5 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [99]-101). 327 $aFour recent cases of financially distressed insurers -- The state of the art in prudential regulation -- Inversion of the production cycle and capital structure of insurance companies -- Absence of a tough claimholder in the financial structure of insurance companies and incomplete contracts -- How to organize the regulation of insurance companies -- The role of reinsurance -- How does insurance regulation fit within other financial regulations? -- Conclusion : Prudential regulation as a substitute for corporate governance. 330 $aIn the 1990's, large insurance companies failed in virtually every major market, prompting a fierce and ongoing debate about how to better protect policyholders. Drawing lessons from the failures of four insurance companies, When Insurers Go Bust dramatically advances this debate by arguing that the current approach to insurance regulation should be replaced with mechanisms that replicate the governance of non-financial firms. Rather than immediately addressing the minutiae of supervision, Guillaume Plantin and Jean-Charles Rochet first identify a fundamental economic rationale for supervising the solvency of insurance companies: policyholders are the "bankers" of insurance companies. But because policyholders are too dispersed to effectively monitor insurers, it might be efficient to delegate monitoring to an institution--a prudential authority. Applying recent developments in corporate finance theory and the economic theory of organizations, the authors describe in practical terms how such authorities could be created and given the incentives to behave exactly like bankers behave toward borrowers, as "tough" claimholders. 606 $aInsurance$xState supervision 606 $aInsurance law$xEconomic aspects 615 0$aInsurance$xState supervision. 615 0$aInsurance law$xEconomic aspects. 676 $a368.941 686 $a83.70$2bcl 700 $aPlantin$b Guillaume$0721763 701 $aRochet$b Jean-Charles$0140852 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910778097103321 996 $aWhen insurers go bust$93854192 997 $aUNINA