LEADER 01030nam0-22003131i-450 001 990007376290403321 005 20220929200805.0 010 $a0-1226-38676-7 035 $a000737629 035 $aFED01000737629 035 $a(Aleph)000737629FED01 100 $a20021204d2001----km-y0itay50------ba 101 0 $aeng 102 $aUS 105 $ay-------001yy 200 1 $aRegional and global capital flows$emacroeconomic causes and consequences$fed. by Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. Krueger 210 $aChicago$aLondon$cThe University of Chicago Press$dc2001 215 $aIX, 394 p.$d24 cm 225 1 $aNBER East Asia seminar on economics$v10 676 $a332.042$v21$zita 702 1$aIto,$bTakatoshi 702 1$aKrueger,$bAnne Osborn$f<1934- > 801 0$aIT$bUNINA$gRICA$2UNIMARC 901 $aBK 912 $a990007376290403321 952 $aXV M3 172$b44453*$eBiblioteca Centrale della Facoltà di Giurisprudenza$fFGBC 959 $aFGBC 996 $aRegional and global capital flows$9693096 997 $aUNINA LEADER 04567nam 2200637 a 450 001 9910777806903321 005 20221108080418.0 010 $a0-300-13504-1 024 7 $a10.12987/9780300135046 035 $a(CKB)1000000000473601 035 $a(StDuBDS)AH23049841 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000157700 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11160344 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000157700 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10139564 035 $a(PQKB)11279118 035 $a(DE-B1597)484827 035 $a(OCoLC)1013946057 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780300135046 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3420322 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10210205 035 $a(OCoLC)923592142 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3420322 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000473601 100 $a20070117d2007 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aFoxbats over Dimona$b[electronic resource] $ethe Soviets' nuclear gamble in the Six-Day War /$fIsabella Ginor and Gideon Remez 210 $aNew Haven $cYale University Press$dc2007 215 $a1 online resource (304 p.) 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 0 $a0-300-12317-5 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 265-273) and index. 327 $tFront matter --$tContents --$tAcknowledgments --$tMaps --$t1. Historiography as Investigative Journalism --$t2. Threat or Bluster --$t3. Antecedents and Motivations --$t4. The Nuclear Context --$t5. The Spymaster and the Communist --$t6. A Nuclear Umbrella for Egypt --$t7. Converging Timelines --$t8. The "Conqueror" and "Victor" Plans --$t9. The Naval and Aerial Buildup --$t10. Mid-May --$t11. Escalation and Denial --$t12. The Badran Talks --$t13. Foxbats over Dimona --$t14. Poised for a Desant --$t15. Un-Finnished Business --$t16. Debates, Delays, and Ditherings --$t17. The Liberty Incident --$t18. Offense Becomes Deterrence --$t19. Aftermath --$tNotes --$tWorks Cited --$tIndex 330 $aIsabella Ginor and Gideon Remez's groundbreaking history of the Six-Day War in 1967 radically changes our understanding of that conflict, casting it as a crucial arena of Cold War intrigue that has shaped the Middle East to this day. The authors, award-winning Israeli journalists and historians, have investigated newly available documents and testimonies from the former Soviet Union, cross-checked them against Israeli and Western sources, and arrived at fresh and startling conclusions. Contrary to previous interpretations, Ginor and Remez's book shows that the Six-Day War was the result of a joint Soviet-Arab gambit to provoke Israel into a preemptive attack. The authors reveal how the Soviets received a secret Israeli message indicating that Israel, despite its official ambiguity, was about to acquire nuclear weapons. Determined to destroy Israel's nuclear program before it could produce an atomic bomb, the Soviets then began preparing for war--well before Moscow accused Israel of offensive intent, the overt trigger of the crisis. Ginor and Remez's startling account details how the Soviet-Arab onslaught was to be unleashed once Israel had been drawn into action and was branded as the aggressor. The Soviets had submarine-based nuclear missiles poised for use against Israel in case it already possessed and tried to use an atomic device, and the USSR prepared and actually began a marine landing on Israel's shores backed by strategic bombers and fighter squadrons. They sent their most advanced, still-secret aircraft, the MiG-25 Foxbat, on provocative sorties over Israel's Dimona nuclear complex to prepare the planned attack on it, and to scare Israel into making the first strike. It was only the unpredicted devastation of Israel's response that narrowly thwarted the Soviet design. 606 $aIsrael-Arab War, 1967$xDiplomatic history 606 $aIsrael-Arab War, 1967$xCauses 607 $aSoviet Union$xForeign relations$zIsrael 607 $aIsrael$xForeign relations$zSoviet Union 607 $aSoviet Union$xForeign relations$zArab countries 607 $aArab countries$xForeign relations$zSoviet Union 615 0$aIsrael-Arab War, 1967$xDiplomatic history. 615 0$aIsrael-Arab War, 1967$xCauses. 676 $a956.04/6 700 $aGinor$b Isabella$01518281 701 $aRemez$b Gideon$f1946-$01518282 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910777806903321 996 $aFoxbats over Dimona$93755744 997 $aUNINA