LEADER 04174oam 22006254a 450 001 9910777657703321 005 20190503073335.0 010 $a0-262-28604-1 010 $a1-282-09747-4 010 $a9786612097478 010 $a1-4237-9029-4 035 $a(CKB)1000000000464427 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000518837 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12214404 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000518837 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10495467 035 $a(PQKB)10028522 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3338549 035 $a(OCoLC)70827484$z(OCoLC)228170824$z(OCoLC)228170825$z(OCoLC)474279696$z(OCoLC)568000569$z(OCoLC)648224705$z(OCoLC)648589627$z(OCoLC)722564875$z(OCoLC)728037079$z(OCoLC)743198190$z(OCoLC)815776417$z(OCoLC)923250187$z(OCoLC)961522128$z(OCoLC)962667094$z(OCoLC)975792395$z(OCoLC)988516014$z(OCoLC)992003835$z(OCoLC)1017993864$z(OCoLC)1037908560$z(OCoLC)1038673415$z(OCoLC)1041570995$z(OCoLC)1047670295$z(OCoLC)1053490073$z(OCoLC)1055383780$z(OCoLC)1066440273$z(OCoLC)1081219828 035 $a(OCoLC-P)70827484 035 $a(MaCbMITP)4185 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3338549 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10173605 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL209747 035 $a(OCoLC)70827484 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000464427 100 $a20060803d2006 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aLectures on antitrust economics /$fMichael D. Whinston 210 $aCambridge, Mass. $cMIT Press$dİ2006 215 $a1 online resource (xii, 249 pages) $cillustrations 225 1 $aCairoli lecture series 311 $a0-262-73187-8 311 $a0-262-23256-1 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [221]-234) and index. 330 $aAntitrust law regulates economic activity but differs in its operation from what is traditionally considered "regulation." Where regulation is often industry-specific and involves the direct setting of prices, product characteristics, or entry, antitrust law focuses more broadly on maintaining certain basic rules of competition. In these lectures Michael Whinston offers an accessible and lucid account of the economics behind antitrust law, looking at some of the most recent developments in antitrust economics and highlighting areas that require further research. He focuses on three areas: price fixing, in which competitors agree to restrict output or raise price; horizontal mergers, in which competitors agree to merge their operations; and exclusionary vertical contracts, in which a competitor seeks to exclude a rival. Antitrust commentators widely regard the prohibition on price fixing as the most settled and economically sound area of antitrust. Whinston's discussion seeks to unsettle this view, suggesting that some fundamental issues in this area are, in fact, not well understood. In his discussion of horizontal mergers, Whinston describes the substantial advances in recent theoretical and empirical work and suggests fruitful directions for further research. The complex area of exclusionary vertical contracts is perhaps the most controversial in antitrust. The influential "Chicago School" cast doubt on arguments that vertical contracts could be profitably used to exclude rivals. Recent theoretical work, to which Whinston has made important contributions, instead shows that such contracts can be profitable tools for exclusion. Whinston's discussion sheds light on the controversy in this area and the nature of those recent theoretical contributions. Sponsored by the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. 410 0$aCairoli lecture series. 606 $aAntitrust law$xEconomic aspects$zUnited States 610 $aECONOMICS/Political Economy 610 $aECONOMICS/Microeconomics 610 $aSOCIAL SCIENCES/Political Science/Public Policy & Law 615 0$aAntitrust law$xEconomic aspects 676 $a338.8/20973 686 $a83.32$2bcl 700 $aWhinston$b Michael Dennis$0116661 801 0$bOCoLC-P 801 1$bOCoLC-P 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910777657703321 996 $aLectures on antitrust economics$9803421 997 $aUNINA