LEADER 05702oam 2200685Ia 450 001 9910777515103321 005 20190503073340.0 010 $a0-262-31163-1 010 $a1-282-10086-6 010 $a9786612100864 010 $a0-262-27762-X 010 $a1-4294-7758-X 035 $a(CKB)1000000000461553 035 $a(EBL)3338559 035 $a(OCoLC)150541685 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000243849 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11237177 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000243849 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10164439 035 $a(PQKB)10648967 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3338559 035 $a(OCoLC)150541685$z(OCoLC)191935695$z(OCoLC)473857589$z(OCoLC)607869011$z(OCoLC)614965178$z(OCoLC)645553012$z(OCoLC)648224861$z(OCoLC)722564988$z(OCoLC)728037116$z(OCoLC)870354819$z(OCoLC)961533507$z(OCoLC)962660057$z(OCoLC)974197208$z(OCoLC)974434783$z(OCoLC)981991202$z(OCoLC)982018953$z(OCoLC)988523698$z(OCoLC)991956876$z(OCoLC)992093265$z(OCoLC)1005638626$z(OCoLC)1018020562$z(OCoLC)1037503371$z(OCoLC)1037926167$z(OCoLC)1038663362$z(OCoLC)1041671805$z(OCoLC)1047694923$z(OCoLC)1053598112$z(OCoLC)1055403087$z(OCoLC)1065119008$z(OCoLC)1081290849$z(OCoLC)1083560911 035 $a(OCoLC-P)150541685 035 $a(MaCbMITP)6155 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3338559 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10173615 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL210086 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000461553 100 $a20070702d2006 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 00$aSelf-representational approaches to consciousness /$fedited by Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford 210 $aCambridge, Mass. $cMIT Press$dİ2006 215 $a1 online resource (569 p.) 300 $a"A Bradford book." 311 $a0-262-61211-9 311 $a0-262-11294-9 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 517-552) and index. 327 $aSelf-Representational Approaches to Consciousness; 1 Introduction; I In Favor of the Self-Representational Approach to Consciousness; 2 Mirror Mirror - Is That All?; 3 Internal-World Skepticism and the Self-Presentational Nature of Phenomenal Consciousness; 4 Emotion and Self-Consciousness; 5 Kant: A Unifi ed Representational Base for All Consciousness; 6 The Self-Representational Structure of Consciousness; 7 The Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness; II Against the Self-Representational Approach to Consciousness; 8 Conscious Awareness and (Self-)Representation 327 $a9 The Case(s) of (Self-)Awareness10 Between Pure Self-Referentialism and the Extrinsic HOT Theory of Consciousness; 11 Perceptual Consciousness: How It Opens Directly Onto the World, Preferring the World to the Mind; 12 Thinking about (Self-)Consciousness: Phenomenological Perspectives; III Connections: Cognition, Attention, and Knowledge; 14 Conscious Beliefs and Desires: A Same-Order Approach; 15 Consciousness, Self, and Attention; 16 Indexicality and Self-Awareness; 17 Consciousness, Representation, and Knowledge; IV Beyond Philosophy: Consciousness and Self-Reference 327 $a19 What Is It Like to Be a Strange Loop?References; List of Contributors; Index 330 8 $aIn this pioneering collection of essays, leading theorists examine the self-representational theory of consciousness, which holds that consciousness always involves some form of self-awareness. The self-representational theory of consciousness stands as an alternative to the two dominant reductive theories of consciousness, the representational theory of consciousness (RTC) and the higher-order monitoring (HOM) theory, combining elements of both RTC and HOM theory in a novel fashion that may avoid the fundamental deficiencies of each. Although self-representationalist views have been common throughout the history of both Western and Eastern philosophy, they have been largely neglected in the recent literature on consciousness. This book approaches the self-representational theory from a range of perspectives, with contributions from scholars in analytic philosophy, phenomenology, and history of philosophy, as well as two longer essays by Antonio Damasio and David Rudrauf and Douglas Hofstadter. The book opens with six essays that argue broadly in favor of self-representationalist views, which are followed by five that argue broadly against them. Contributors next consider connections to such philosophical issues as the nature of propositional attitudes, knowledge, attention, and indexical reference. Finally, Damasio and Rudrauf link consciousness as lived with consciousness as described in neurobiological terms; and Hofstadter compares consciousness to the "strange loop" of mathematical self-reference brought to light by Go?del's incompleteness theorems. Contributors:Andrew Brook, Peter Carruthers, Antonio Damasio, John J. Drummond, Jason Ford, Rocco J. Gennaro, George Graham, Christopher S. Hill, Douglas R. Hofstadter, Terry Horgan, Tomis Kapitan, Uriah Kriegel, Keith Lehrer, Joseph Levine, Robert W. Lurz, David Rudrauf, David Woodruff Smith, John Tienson, Robert Van Gulick, Kathleen Wider, Kenneth Williford, Dan Zahavi. 606 $aConsciousness 606 $aMental representation 610 $aCOGNITIVE SCIENCES/General 610 $aPHILOSOPHY/Philosophy of Mind/General 615 0$aConsciousness. 615 0$aMental representation. 676 $a126 701 $aKriegel$b Uriah$01467517 701 $aWilliford$b Kenneth$0888296 801 0$bOCoLC-P 801 1$bOCoLC-P 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910777515103321 996 $aSelf-representational approaches to consciousness$93678191 997 $aUNINA