LEADER 10959nam 2200553 450 001 9910766882903321 005 20231213075708.0 010 $a3-031-38635-3 035 $a(CKB)29092671400041 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC30978570 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL30978570 035 $a(OCoLC)1414468765 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC30975709 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL30975709 035 $a(EXLCZ)9929092671400041 100 $a20231213d2023 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aIndustrial Organization $ePractice Exercises with Answer Keys /$fPak-Sing Choi, Eric Dunaway, and Felix Mun?oz-Garcia 205 $aSecond edition. 210 1$aCham, Switzerland :$cSpringer,$d[2023] 210 4$d©2023 215 $a1 online resource (680 pages) 225 1 $aSpringer Texts in Business and Economics Series 311 08$a9783031386343 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aIntro -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- 1 Monopoly -- Introduction -- Exercise #1.1: Monopoly with Linear CostsA -- Exercise #1.2: Monopoly with Convex CostsA -- Exercise #1.3: Monopolist with Linear Inverse Demand and Generic Cost FunctionB -- Exercise #1.4: Convex, Concave, and Linear Demand in MonopolyC -- Exercise #1.5: Maximizing Revenue or Maximizing Profit?A -- Exercise #1.6: Learning-by-Doing and Commitment in MonopolyB -- Exercise #1.7: Monopolist Serving Two Interdependent MarketsB -- Exercise #1.8: Multiplant Monopolist-IA -- Exercise #1.9: Multiplant Monopolist-IIB -- Exercise #1.10: Ramsey PricingB -- Exercise #1.11: Monopolist Serving Two Separated Markets-IA -- Exercise #1.12: Monopolist Serving Two Separated Markets-IIA -- Exercise #1.13: Geographical Price DiscriminationB -- Exercise #1.14: Two-Part PricingA -- Exercise #1.15: Monopoly Facing Entry Threats - Based on Tirole1988C -- Exercise #1.16: Multiproduct Monopoly with Economies of ScopeB -- Exercise #1.17: Vertical Differentiation and Natural MonopolyB -- Exercise #1.18: Persuasive Advertising in MonopolyB -- Exercise #1.19: Informative Advertising in MonopolyB -- Exercise #1.20: Behavior-Based Price Discrimination in Monopoly - Based on Fudenberg2007 and Armstrong2007B -- 2 Simultaneous Quantity Competition -- Introduction -- Exercise #2.1: Cournot Duopoly with Symmetric CostsA -- Exercise #2.2: Cournot Duopoly - Necessary and Sufficient ConditionsB -- Exercise #2.3: Cournot Oligopoly with Three Symmetric FirmsA -- Exercise #2.4: Cournot Oligopoly with N?2 Symmetric FirmsB -- Exercise #2.5: Comparing Equilibrium and Socially Optimal Outputs Under Cournot CompetitionB -- Exercise #2.6: Cournot Pricing Formula - DerivationA -- Exercise #2.7: Cournot Pricing Formula - ApplicationA -- Exercise #2.8: Cournot Pricing Formula - Parametric ExampleA. 327 $aExercise #2.9: Cournot Duopoly with Asymmetric Marginal CostsA -- Exercise #2.10: Cournot Competition with n Firms Facing Asymmetric CostsC -- Exercise #2.11: Cournot with Only One Firm Benefiting from a Cost AdvantageB -- Exercise #2.12: Social Welfare with Cost-Symmetric Firms Selling Heterogeneous Goods and Competing in QuantitiesA -- Exercise #2.13: Cournot Competition with Heterogeneous GoodsA -- Exercise #2.14: Cournot Competition with N?2 Asymmetric Firms Allowing for Product DifferentiationB -- Exercise #2.15: Cournot Competition with N?2 Asymmetric Firms Allowing for Product Differentiation: MergerB -- Exercise #2.16: Cournot Competition with N?2 Asymmetric Firms Allowing for Product Differentiation: Merger IncentivesB -- Exercise #2.17: Social Welfare with Cost-Asymmetric Firms Selling Heterogeneous Goods and Competing in QuantitiesA -- Exercise #2.18: Entry that Reduces Aggregate OutputA -- Exercise #2.19: Cournot with Asymmetric Fixed CostsB -- Exercise #2.20: Can Fewer Firms Decrease Prices?B -- Exercise #2.21: Cournot with Equity Shares - Based on Reynolds1986B -- Exercise #2.22: Cournot Competition Between a Private and a Public FirmB -- Exercise #2.23: Cournot Competition Between N Private Firms and a Public FirmB -- Exercise #2.24: Managerial Incentives in Cournot - Based on Fershtman1987C -- Exercise #2.25: Cournot Competition Under Incomplete Information-IB -- Exercise #2.26: Cournot Competition Under Incomplete Information-IIC -- Exercise #2.27: Cournot Competition Under Incomplete Information-IIIC -- Exercise #2.28: Cournot Competition When Firms Are Asymmetrically Informed of Product DifferentiationB -- Exercise #2.29: Nonlinear Pricing in Oligopoly - Based on Harrison2001C -- 3 Simultaneous Price Competition -- Introduction -- Exercise #3.1: Price Competition with Homogeneous Products and Symmetric CostsA. 327 $aExercise #3.2: Price Competition with Homogeneous Products and Asymmetric CostsA -- Exercise #3.3: Price Competition with Price-Matching GuaranteesB -- Exercise #3.4: Price Competition with Heterogeneous Goods and Symmetric CostsA -- Exercise #3.5: Price Competition with Heterogeneous Goods and Asymmetric CostsB -- Exercise #3.6: Price Competition with Homogeneous Goods and Uncertain CostsC -- Exercise #3.7: Price Competition with Heterogeneous Goods and Uncertain CostsB -- Exercise #3.8: Entry-Deterring PricesC -- Exercise #3.9: Using Capacity Constraints to Reconcile Bertrand and Cournot ModelsC -- Exercise #3.10: Generalized Hotelling ModelA -- Exercise #3.11: Hotelling Model of Horizontal Product DifferentiationA -- Exercise #3.12: Hotelling with Asymmetric Transportation CostsB -- Exercise #3.13: Socially Optimal Location in Hotelling ModelB -- Exercise #3.14: Hotelling with Non-uniformly Distributed Consumers.C -- Exercise #3.15: Salop Circle of Horizontal Product DifferentiationB -- Exercise #3.16: Horizontal Differentiation in Two Dimensions, Based on Irmean1998C -- Exercise #3.17: Vertical Differentiation, Quality Choice, and Price CompetitionB -- Exercise #3.18: Products Horizontally and Vertically DifferentiatedC -- 4 Sequential Competition -- Introduction -- Exercise #4.1: Stackelberg Competition with Two Symmetric FirmsA -- Exercise #4.2: Stackelberg Competition with Three Symmetric FirmsB -- Exercise #4.3: Stackelberg Competition with Two Asymmetric FirmsB -- Exercise #4.4: Stackelberg Competition, General PresentationC -- Exercise #4.5: Stackelberg Competition Between a Private Leader and a Public FollowerB -- Exercise #4.6: Stackelberg Competition Between a Public Leader and a Private FollowerB -- Exercise #4.7: Stackelberg Competition Under Incomplete Information - Uninformed LeaderB. 327 $aExercise #4.8: Stackelberg with Demand Shocks, Based on Liu2005B -- Exercise #4.9: Stackelberg Competition Under Incomplete Information - Uninformed FollowerC -- Exercise #4.10: Hybrid Competition - Leader Choosing Output and Follower Choosing PriceB -- Exercise #4.11: Stackelberg Competition with m Leaders, Based on Huck2001C -- Exercise #4.12: Sequential Price Competition with Homogeneous GoodsA -- Exercise #4.13: Sequential Price Competition with Heterogeneous GoodsB -- Exercise #4.14: Committing in Prices or Quantities, Based on Singh1984B -- Exercise #4.15: Strategic Pre-commitment by Only One Firm Followed by Cournot Competition, Based on Fudenberg1984B -- Exercise #4.16: Strategic Pre-commitment by Only One Firm Followed by Bertrand CompetitionB -- Exercise #4.17: Strategic Pre-commitment by Both FirmsB -- 5 Regulating Imperfectly Competitive Markets -- Introduction -- Exercise #5.1: Regulating a Monopolist Under Complete InformationA -- Exercise #5.2: Regulating a Polluting MonopolyB -- Exercise #5.3: Regulating a Monopolist Under Complete Information - Pigouvian EPAA -- Exercise #5.4: Regulating a Natural MonopolistA -- Exercise #5.5: Regulating a Monopolist Under Incomplete Information-IB -- Exercise #5.6: Regulating a Monopolist Under Incomplete Information-IIC -- Exercise #5.7: Regulating a Cournot OligopolyA -- Exercise #5.8: Regulating a Polluting Cournot OligopolyB -- Exercise #5.9: Regulating a Polluting Cournot Oligopoly Under Complete Information - Pigouvian EPAB -- Exercise #5.10: Regulating Polluting Firms That Compete à la StackelbergB -- Exercise #5.11: Endogenous Entry DecisionsB -- Exercise #5.12: Tax Incidence in MonopolyC -- 6 R& -- D Incentives -- Introduction -- Exercise #6.1: Incentives to Innovate Under MonopolyA -- Exercise #6.2: Quantity Competition: More Incentives to Innovate Than Under Monopoly?B. 327 $aExercise #6.3: Price Competition: Less Incentives to Innovate Under Monopoly?B -- Exercise #6.4: Larger R& -- D Under Monopoly or Duopoly? Welfare EvaluationC -- Exercise #6.5: More Competitive Industries and R& -- D InvestmentC -- Exercise #6.6: Research Joint Ventures in R& -- DB -- Exercise #6.7: Research Joint Ventures in R& -- D When Firms Compete in PricesB -- Exercise #6.8: Spillover Effects in R& -- D InvestmentB -- Exercise #6.9: Two Firms Sequentially Developing New ProductsB -- Exercise #6.10: Green Innovation, Based on Lambertini2017C -- Exercise #6.11: Incentives to Innovate in Cournot, Based on Delbono1991C -- Exercise #6.12: Cost-Reducing Investments That Accommodate EntryB -- Exercise #6.13: Cost-Reducing Investments That Deter EntryB -- Exercise #6.14: Is Entry Deterrence Profitable?B -- Exercise #6.15: Optimal Patent Length, Based on Takalo2001C -- Exercise #6.16: Optimal Patent Length, An ApplicationB -- 7 Mergers -- Introduction -- Exercise #7.1: Mergers Between Two FirmsA -- Exercise #7.2: Mergers Between n?2 Firms, Based on Salant1983B -- Exercise #7.3: Unsustainable MergersA -- Exercise #7.4: Bertrand Mergers with Differentiated ProductsB -- Exercise #7.5: Cournot Mergers with Differentiated Products and Symmetric CostsB -- Exercise #7.6: Cournot Mergers with Differentiated Products and Asymmetric Costs, Based on Gelves2014C -- Exercise #7.7: Cartels with SynergiesB -- Exercise #7.8: Merger to Gain Economies of ScopeB -- Exercise #7.9: Merger to Gain Stackelberg LeadershipB -- Exercise #7.10: Merger Between a Leader and Follower, Based on Huck2001C -- Exercise #7.11: The ``Tragedy of the Anticommons,'' Heller1998B -- Exercise #7.12: Mergers in Polluting Markets, Based on Fikru2016C -- 8 Collusion -- Introduction -- Exercise #8.1: Collusion with Two Firms Competing à la CournotB. 327 $aExercise #8.2: Collusion with n Firms Competing à la CournotC. 410 0$aSpringer texts in business and economics. 606 $aIndustrial organization (Economic theory) 615 0$aIndustrial organization (Economic theory) 676 $a354.81150006 700 $aChoi$b Pak-Sing$0847333 702 $aDunaway$b Eric 702 $aMun?oz-Garcia$b Felix 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910766882903321 996 $aIndustrial organization$92854009 997 $aUNINA