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035   $a(oapen)https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/30490
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100   $a20231110d1995      uy         0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aRussian economic reform /$fJim Leitzel
210   $d2005
210  1$aLondon ;$aNew York :$cRoutledge,$d1995.
210  4$dİ1995
215   $a1 online resource (203 p.)
300   $aDescription based upon print version of record.
311 08$a0-415-12511-1 
311 08$a0-415-12510-3 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages [175]-184) and index.
327   $aBOOK COVER; HALF-TITLE; ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS; DEDICATION; TITLE; COPYRIGHT; CONTETNS; PREFACE; Introduction; Chapter 1 Markets and plans; Chapter 2 Russian market activity; Chapter 3 Price liberalization and inflation; Chapter 4 Employment and unemployment; Chapter 5 Privatization; Chapter 6 Monopoly; Chapter 7 Income and living standards; Chapter 8 False hopes; Conclusions; Notes; Bibliography; Index;
330   $aQuestioning the attempts to portray the reform of the Russian economy as a disaster, Jim Leitzel maintains that these portrayals are misleading because they fail to take account of the many complexities of the transition. Perceptions about the pre-reform Russian economy are often inaccurate, primarily because the logic of a centrally planned economy is so different from a capitalist one that familiar economic phenomena, such as inflation and unemployment, take unfamiliar forms. The resulting misconceptions about the starting point for Russian economic reform lead to an exaggeration of the cost
606   $aPost-communism$xEconomic aspects$zRussia (Federation)
607   $aRussia (Federation)$xEconomic policy$y1991-
607   $aSoviet Union$xEconomic conditions
615  0$aPost-communism$xEconomic aspects
676   $a330.947
676   $a338.947
686   $aBUS000000$aBUS069000$2bisacsh
700   $aLeitzel$b Jim$0893448
712 02$aWorld Bank.
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
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906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910765993103321
996   $aRussian Economic Reform$93362932
997   $aUNINA