LEADER 04568nam 2200553 450 001 9910746595003321 005 20231010153508.0 010 $a1-03-530154-7 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC30752265 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL30752265 035 $a(CKB)28284168900041 035 $a(NjHacI)9928284168900041 035 $a(UtOrBLW)eep9781035301546 035 $a(EXLCZ)9928284168900041 100 $a20231010d2023 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 00$aBuilding an International Cybersecurity Regime $eMultistakeholder Diplomacy /$fIan Johnstone, Arun Sukumar, and Joel Trachtman, editors 205 $aFirst edition. 210 1$aNorthampton :$cEdward Elgar Publishing,$d2023. 215 $a1 online resource (282 pages) 225 0 $aElgar International Law and Technology Series 300 $aIncludes index. 311 08$aPrint version: Johnstone, Ian Building an International Cybersecurity Regime Cheltenham : Edward Elgar Publishing Limited,c2023 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aFront Matter -- Copyright -- Contents -- Contributors -- PART I Introduction -- 1. Building cybersecurity through multistakeholder diplomacy: Politics, processes, and prospects -- PART II Thematic issues -- 2. The geopolitics of multistakeholder cyber diplomacy: A comparative analysis -- 3. Multistakeholder characteristics of past and ongoing cybersecurity norms processes -- 4. Developing multistakeholder structures for cybersecurity norms: Learning from experience -- 5. Implementing cybersecurity norms: The design of international institutions -- PART III Country perspectives -- 6. U.S. multistakeholder engagement in cyber stability issues -- 7. Russia's participation in multistakeholder diplomacy for cybersecurity norms -- 8. Rethinking Chinese multistakeholder governance of cybersecurity -- 9. India's "passive" multistakeholder cyber diplomacy -- 10. Brazil and multistakeholder diplomacy for the Internet: Past achievements, current challenges and the road ahead -- 11. Taking stock of Estonia's multistakeholder cyber diplomacy -- PART IV Conclusion -- 12. The way ahead for multistakeholder cyber diplomacy -- Index. 330 $a"Providing a much-needed study on cybersecurity regime building, this comprehensive book is a detailed analysis of cybersecurity norm-making processes and country positions, through the lens of multi-stakeholder diplomacy. Multi-disciplinary and multi-national scholars and practitioners use insights drawn from high-level discussion groups to provide a rigorous analysis of how major cyber powers view multi-stakeholder diplomacy. Looking at how past cybersecurity initiatives and multi-stakeholder negotiations in other fields illuminate its dynamics, this book will help put states' approaches towards multi-stakeholder cyber diplomacy into perspective, and frame the role of private actors in cybersecurity regime building. Evaluating the most promising institutional arrangements and mechanisms for implementing cybersecurity, this book combines top-down analyses relevant to the design of international cybersecurity regimes with bottom-up case studies, tracing the approaches of important states towards multi-stakeholder participation in cyber diplomacy. With a wealth of policy-relevant findings, this book will be welcomed by practitioners and scholars of international law, international organisation and international cybersecurity as well as multi-stakeholder governance and multilateral regimes. Policymakers and diplomats involved in international cybersecurity processes will also benefit from its cutting-edge comparative analysis of the approaches of key cyber powers"--$cProvided by publisher. 410 0$aElgar International Law and Technology Series 606 $aComputer security$xLaw and legislation 606 $aCyber intelligence (Computer security) 606 $aInternet$xLaw and legislation 615 0$aComputer security$xLaw and legislation. 615 0$aCyber intelligence (Computer security) 615 0$aInternet$xLaw and legislation. 676 $a005.8026 702 $aJohnstone$b Ian 702 $aSukumar$b Arun 702 $aTrachtman$b Joel 712 02$aEdward Elgar Publishing, 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910746595003321 996 $aBuilding an International Cybersecurity Regime$93572796 997 $aUNINA LEADER 03751oam 2200565zu 450 001 9910220075803321 005 20220831230932.0 010 $a0-8330-9332-0 035 $a(CKB)3710000000595184 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001622570 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)16359263 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001622570 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)14919262 035 $a(PQKB)10626309 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000595184 100 $a20160829d2015 uh 0 101 0 $aeng 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aWhat works best when building partner capacity in challenging contexts /$fChristopher Paul 210 31$aSanta Monica, CA :$cRand Corporation$d2015 215 $a1 online resource (xix, 58 pages) $cblack and white illustration, black and white chart 225 0 $aResearch report (Rand Corporation) 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 300 $a"Prepared for the Joint Staff J5, the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy"-- 311 1 $a0-8330-8871-8 330 3 $a"For both diplomatic and national security reasons, security cooperation continues to be important for the United States. The needs and existing capabilities of various nations differ, however, as will results. In previous research, RAND identified a series of factors that correlate with the success of building partner capacity (BPC) efforts. Some of these are under U.S. control, and some are inherent in the partner nation or under its control. Strategic imperatives sometimes compel the United States to work with PNs that lack favorable characteristics but with which the United States needs to conduct BPC anyway. This report explores what the United States can do, when conducting BPC in challenging contexts, to maximize prospects for success. The authors address this question using the logic model outlined in a companion report and examining a series of case studies, looking explicitly at the challenges that can interfere with BPC. Some of the challenges stemmed from U.S. shortcomings, such as policy or funding issues; others from the partner's side, including issues with practices, personalities, baseline capacity, and lack of willingness; still others from disagreements among various stakeholders over objectives and approaches. Among the factors correlated with success in overcoming these challenges were consistency of funding and implementation, shared security interests, and matching objectives with the partner nation's ability to absorb and sustain capabilities."--Back cover. 606 $aMilitary assistance, American$xInternational cooperation 606 $aMilitary education$xInternational cooperation$xTraining of 606 $aSoldiers$xInternational cooperation 606 $aNational security$xInternational cooperation 606 $aArmies$2HILCC 606 $aMilitary & Naval Science$2HILCC 606 $aLaw, Politics & Government$2HILCC 615 0$aMilitary assistance, American$xInternational cooperation. 615 0$aMilitary education$xInternational cooperation$xTraining of. 615 0$aSoldiers$xInternational cooperation. 615 0$aNational security$xInternational cooperation. 615 7$aArmies 615 7$aMilitary & Naval Science 615 7$aLaw, Politics & Government 676 $a355/.03273 700 $aPaul$b Christopher$f1971-$0904747 712 02$aNational Defense Research Institute (U.S.) 801 0$bPQKB 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910220075803321 996 $aWhat works best when building partner capacity in challenging contexts$92907993 997 $aUNINA