LEADER 03158nam 2200589Ia 450 001 9910739404403321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a94-007-6019-1 024 7 $a10.1007/978-94-007-6019-6 035 $a(CKB)2670000000536484 035 $a(EBL)1083707 035 $a(OCoLC)829674445 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000878488 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11486329 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000878488 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10832355 035 $a(PQKB)11160923 035 $a(DE-He213)978-94-007-6019-6 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1083707 035 $a(PPN)168342162 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000536484 100 $a20130311d2013 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 00$aAssessment of the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea /$fJungmin Kang, editor 205 $a1st ed. 2013. 210 $aDordrecht ;$aNew York $cSpringer$dc2013 215 $a1 online resource (137 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a94-007-6018-3 311 $a94-007-9649-8 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aPreface by Olli Heinonen -- Introduction by Jungmin Kang -- Part One: North Korea -- Part Two: Iran -- Part Three: North Korea ? Iran Connection. 330 $aWhen we are looking at proliferation cases, there are a number of lessons ? positive and negative ? learnt. First, facts reported by the IAEA are essential for the international community in assessing the compliance and risks of possible clandestine activities. Second, the IAEA verification scheme is biting when it fully exercises its verification rights, and when it is provided with the requisite cooperation. Third, when countries face questions raised by the IAEA, those that chose to turn the course and / or cooperated to remove concerns and ambiguities resolved their nuclear dossiers in a satisfactory manner and fairly swiftly. Fourth, when states adopt the course of confrontation, as are currently the cases with Iran, Syria and North Korea, the situation becomes more complicated and more difficult to resolve. Fifth, dragging non-compliance and challenging of the authority of the United Nations Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors erodes the international non-proliferation regime. This book addresses two proliferation cases, Iran and North Korea providing extensive snapshots on the currently known nuclear programs, and analyses failures and weaknesses of past verification activities, and makes innovative suggestions for ways forward. 606 $aNuclear weapons$zKorea (North) 606 $aNuclear weapons$zIran 606 $aNuclear nonproliferation 615 0$aNuclear weapons 615 0$aNuclear weapons 615 0$aNuclear nonproliferation. 676 $a327.1747095193 701 $aKang$b Jungmin$0838999 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910739404403321 996 $aAssessment of the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea$94191715 997 $aUNINA