LEADER 03623nam 22006015 450 001 9910734826603321 005 20230628124638.0 010 $a3-031-33480-9 024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-031-33480-1 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC30611265 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL30611265 035 $a(DE-He213)978-3-031-33480-1 035 $a(CKB)27279125500041 035 $a(EXLCZ)9927279125500041 100 $a20230628d2023 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aEpistemic Thought Experiments and Intuitions /$fby Manhal Hamdo 205 $a1st ed. 2023. 210 1$aCham :$cSpringer International Publishing :$cImprint: Springer,$d2023. 215 $a1 online resource (192 pages) 225 1 $aPhilosophical Studies Series,$x2542-8349 ;$v150 311 08$aPrint version: Hamdo, Manhal Epistemic Thought Experiments and Intuitions Cham : Springer International Publishing AG,c2023 9783031334795 327 $aIntroduction -- Chapter 1: Epistemic Thought Experiment and Intuition -- Chapter 2: The Nature of Epistemic Intuition -- Chapter 3: The Epistemic Status of Intuitions -- Chapter 4: Epistemic Intuition in Light of Intuition-Deniers -- Conclusion -- Bibliography. 330 $aThis work investigates intuitions' nature, demonstrating how philosophers can best use them in epistemology. First, the author considers several paradigmatic thought experiments in epistemology that depict the appeal to intuition. He then argues that the nature of thought experiment-generated intuitions is not best explained by an a priori Platonism. Second, the book instead develops and argues for a thin conception of epistemic intuitions. The account maintains that intuition is neither a priori nor a posteriori but multi-dimensional. It is an intentional but non-propositional mental state that is also non-conceptual and non-phenomenal in nature. Moreover, this state is individuated by its progenitor, namely, the relevant thought experiment. Third, the author provides an argument for the evidential status of intuitions based on the correct account of the nature of epistemic intuition. The suggestion is the fitting-ness approach: intuition alone has no epistemic status. Rather, intuition has evidentiary value as long as it fits well with other pieces into a whole, namely, the pertinent thought experiment. Finally, the book addresses the key challenges raised by supporters of anti-centrality, according to which philosophers do not regard intuition as central evidence in philosophy. To that end, the author responds to them, showing that they fail to affect the account of intuition developed in this book.This text appeals to students and researchers working in epistemology. . 410 0$aPhilosophical Studies Series,$x2542-8349 ;$v150 606 $aKnowledge, Theory of 606 $aPhilosophy 606 $aMethodology 606 $aAnalysis (Philosophy) 606 $aEpistemology 606 $aPhilosophical Methods 606 $aAnalytic Philosophy 615 0$aKnowledge, Theory of. 615 0$aPhilosophy. 615 0$aMethodology. 615 0$aAnalysis (Philosophy) 615 14$aEpistemology. 615 24$aPhilosophical Methods. 615 24$aAnalytic Philosophy. 676 $a121 676 $a121 700 $aHamdo$b Manhal$01373516 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910734826603321 996 $aEpistemic Thought Experiments and Intuitions$93404580 997 $aUNINA