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010   $a9783031293283$b(electronic bk.)
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024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-031-29328-3
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181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
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200 10$aLogical Empiricism and Naturalism $eNeurath and Carnap?s Metatheory of Science /$fby Joseph Bentley
205   $a1st ed. 2023.
210  1$aCham :$cSpringer Nature Switzerland :$cImprint: Springer,$d2023.
215   $a1 online resource (230 pages)
225 1 $aVienna Circle Institute Library
311 08$aPrint version: Bentley, Joseph Logical Empiricism and Naturalism Cham : Springer,c2023 9783031293276 
327   $aIntroduction -- 1. Naturalism and the Vienna Circle -- 2. Neurath?s Epistemology of Science -- 3. Neurath?s Conception of Protocol Statements -- 4. Carnapian Explication -- 5. Quine, Carnap, and Analyticity -- 6. Challenges to the Bipartite Metatheory Interpretation -- 7. Bipartite Metatheory in Application.
330   $aThis text provides an extensive exploration of the relationship between the thought of Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap, providing a new argument for the complementarity of their mature philosophies as part of a collaborative metatheory of science. In arguing that both Neurath and Carnap must be interpreted as proponents of epistemological naturalism, and that their naturalisms rest on shared philosophical ground, it is also demonstrated that the boundaries and possibilities for epistemological naturalism are not as restrictive as Quinean orthodoxy has previously suggested. Both building on and challenging the scholarship of the past four decades, this naturalist reading of Carnap also provides a new interpretation of Carnap?s conception of analyticity, allowing for a refutation of the Quinean argument for the incompatibility of naturalism and the analytic/synthetic distinction. In doing so, the relevance and potential importance of their scientific meta-theory for contemporary questions in the philosophy of science is demonstrated. This text appeals to students and researchers working on Logical Empiricism, Quine, the history of analytic philosophy and the history of philosophy of science, as well as proponents of naturalized epistemology.
410  0$aVienna Circle Institute Library
606   $aAnalysis (Philosophy)
606   $aScience$xPhilosophy
606   $aKnowledge, Theory of
606   $aPhilosophy$xHistory
606   $aAnalytic Philosophy
606   $aPhilosophy of Science
606   $aEpistemology
606   $aHistory of Philosophy
610   $aKnowledge, Theory Of
610   $aPhilosophy
610   $aAnalysis (Philosophy)
615  0$aAnalysis (Philosophy)
615  0$aScience$xPhilosophy.
615  0$aKnowledge, Theory of.
615  0$aPhilosophy$xHistory.
615 14$aAnalytic Philosophy.
615 24$aPhilosophy of Science.
615 24$aEpistemology.
615 24$aHistory of Philosophy.
676   $a146.4
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700   $aBentley$b Joseph$01363645
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996   $aLogical Empiricism and Naturalism$93384486
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