LEADER 03483nam 2200337 450 001 9910720873403321 005 20230703162958.0 035 $a(CKB)5710000000124525 035 $a(NjHacI)995710000000124525 035 $a(EXLCZ)995710000000124525 100 $a20230703d2020 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aRegulating mergers and acquisitions of U.S. electric utilities $eindustry concentration and corporate complication /$fScott Hempling 210 1$aCheltenham, England :$cEdward Elgar Publishing,$d2020. 215 $a1 online resource (234 pages) 327 $aPart I: The transactions : sales of public franchises for private gain, undisciplined by competition, producing a concentrated, complicated industry no one intended Diverse strategies, common purpose : selling public franchises for private gain -- Missing from utility merger markets : competitive discipline -- The structural result : concentration and complication no one intended -- Part II: The harms : economic waste, misallocation of gain, competitive distortion, customer risks and costs -- Suboptimal couplings cause economic waste -- Merging parties divert franchise value from the customers who created it -- Mergers can distort competition : market power, anticompetitive conduct and unearned advantage -- Hierarchical conflict harms customers -- Part III: Regulatory lapses : visionlessness, reactivity, deference -- Regulators' unreadiness : checklists instead of visions -- Promoters' strategy : frame mergers as simple, positive, inevitable -- How do regulators respond? : by ceding leadership, underestimating negatives and accepting minor positives -- Explanations : passion gaps and mental shortcuts -- Part IV: Solutions : regulatory posture, practices and infrastructure -- Regulatory posture and practice : less instinct, more analysis; less reactivity, more preparation -- Regulatory infrastructure : strengthen regulatory resources, clarify statutory powers, assess mergers' effects -- The U.S. electric industry : a tutorial -- Appendix A.1 List of companies referenced -- Appendix A.2 Does federal bankruptcy law preempt a state commissions franchising authority? -- Appendix A.3 Ring-fencing provisions approved by the D.C. Public Service Commission. 330 $a"What happens when electric utility monopolies pursue their acquisition interests--undisciplined by competition, and insufficiently disciplined by the regulators responsible for replicating competition? Since the mid-1980s, mergers and acquisitions of U.S. electric utilities have halved the number of local, independent utilities. Mostly debt-financed, these transactions have converted retiree-suitable investments into subsidiaries of geographically scattered conglomerates. Written by one of the U.S.'s leading regulatory thinkers, this book combines legal, accounting, economic and financial analysis of the 30-year march of U.S. electricity mergers with insights from the dynamic field of behavioral economics." 606 $aElectric utilities$xLaw and legislation 615 0$aElectric utilities$xLaw and legislation. 676 $a343.0929 700 $aHempling$b Scott$01277923 801 0$bNjHacI 801 1$bNjHacl 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910720873403321 996 $aRegulating mergers and acquisitions of U.S. electric utilities$93012254 997 $aUNINA