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200 14$aAn 'exit strategy' not a winning strategy? $eintelligence lessons learned from the British 'emergency' in South Arabia, 1963-67 /$fby Stephen Andrew Campbell
210  1$aFort Leavenworth, Kansas :$cCommand and General Staff College :$cCombat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center,$d2014.
215   $a1 online resource (xii, 135 pages) $cillustrations, maps
225 1 $aArt of War Papers
300   $a"First printing April 2014."
300   $aReprint of a thesis presented to the faculty of the US Army Command and General Staff College.
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references.
517   $aExit strategy' not a winning strategy? 
606   $aMilitary intelligence$zGreat Britain$xHistory$y20th century
606   $aCounterinsurgency$zGreat Britain$xHistory$y20th century
606   $aCounterinsurgency$2fast
606   $aMilitary intelligence$2fast
607   $aYemen (Republic)$xHistory$y1962-1972
607   $aGreat Britain$2fast
607   $aYemen (Republic)$2fast
608   $aHistory.$2fast
615  0$aMilitary intelligence$xHistory
615  0$aCounterinsurgency$xHistory
615  7$aCounterinsurgency.
615  7$aMilitary intelligence.
700   $aCampbell$b Stephen Andrew$01413668
712 02$aCombat Studies Institute (U.S.).$bPress,
712 02$aU.S. Army Command and General Staff College,
801  0$bGPO
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906   $aBOOK
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996   $aAn 'exit strategy' not a winning strategy$93510628
997   $aUNINA