LEADER 03523oam 2200637 450 001 9910715076403321 005 20210917133150.0 035 $a(CKB)5470000002507280 035 $a(OCoLC)1020302685 035 $a(EXLCZ)995470000002507280 100 $a20180117d2018 ua 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cn$2rdamedia 183 $anc$2rdacarrier 200 10$aAt the limit of complexity $eBritish military operations in North Persia and the Caucasus 1918 /$fRoland P. Minez 210 1$aFort Leavenworth, Kansas :$cArmy University Press,$d2018. 215 $a1 online resource (viii, 140 pages) $cillustrations, maps (some color) 225 1 $aArt of war papers 300 $a"A US Army Command and General Staff College Press Book." 311 $a1-940804-06-X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 131-140. 330 $aIn a largely forgotten chapter of the First World War, Britain sent a small task force to the Caucasus and Northern Persia in 1918. Named Dunsterforce after its commander, Major General Dunsterville, this group attempted to organize indigenous forces to defeat an Ottoman Empire offensive to seize the southern Caucasus. A comprehensive campaign study of Dunsterforce and an analysis of its successes and failures provide insights into the complexities of modern armed conflict. An understanding of the strategic environment in which Dunsterforce operated, the interests of the various actors in the region, and the lines of operation that Dunsterville chose to accomplish his objectives may enable current and future practitioners of the art of war to face the difficulties inherent in such operations. Dunsterforce's successes were due to the coordinated and skillful use of all elements of British military and national power, no matter how inadequate the actual military power was. Yet there are limits to what skill alone can achieve and those limits were revealed during the operation. The scant troops available, conflicting guidance from higher headquarters, lackluster will of indigenous forces, and immense complexity of the operating environment ensured that Dunsterforce did not achieve all the lofty goals envisioned by the British political leaders.--Provided by publisher. 517 $aAt the limit of complexity 606 $aWorld War, 1914-1918$xCampaigns$zCaucasus 606 $aWorld War, 1914-1918$xCampaigns$zIran 606 $aSpecial operations (Military science)$zCaucasus 606 $aMilitary campaigns$2fast 606 $aSpecial operations (Military science)$2fast 607 $aGreat Britain$xArmed Forces$xHistory$y20th century 607 $aCaucasus$2fast 607 $aGreat Britain$2fast 607 $aIran$2fast 608 $aHistory.$2fast 615 0$aWorld War, 1914-1918$xCampaigns 615 0$aWorld War, 1914-1918$xCampaigns 615 0$aSpecial operations (Military science) 615 7$aMilitary campaigns. 615 7$aSpecial operations (Military science) 676 $a940.4/38 700 $aMinez$b Roland P.$01371881 712 02$aArmy University Press (U.S.), 712 02$aU.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 801 0$bDLC 801 1$bDLC 801 2$bOCLCO 801 2$bOCLCQ 801 2$bOCLCF 801 2$bOCLCA 801 2$bOCL 801 2$bGPO 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910715076403321 996 $aAt the limit of complexity$93401646 997 $aUNINA