LEADER 00745nam 2200265z- 450 001 9910703340103321 005 20241218125624.0 035 $a(CKB)5450000000381164 035 $a(DcWaBHL)141058 035 $a(EXLCZ)995450000000381164 100 $a20240129c2009uuuu -u- - 101 0 $aeng 200 10$aCactus moth (Cactoblastis cactorum) 210 1$a[Riverdale, MD?]$cU.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Animal Plant Health Inspection$d2009 215 $a1 online resource 517 $aCactus moth 606 $aInsect pests 606 $aPyralidae 615 4$aInsect pests 615 4$aPyralidae 801 0$bAGL 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910703340103321 996 $aCactus moth (Cactoblastis cactorum)$93216376 997 $aUNINA LEADER 07826oam 2200913 c 450 001 9910972000003321 005 20251102090541.0 010 $a3-96975-264-7 024 3 $a9783969752647 035 $a(CKB)5720000000034974 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC29731823 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL29731823 035 $a(Brill | mentis)9783969752647 035 $a(EXLCZ)995720000000034974 100 $a20251102d2022 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aFirst-Person Thought$eAction, Identification and Experience$fMaik Niemeck 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aPaderborn$cBrill | mentis$d2022 215 $a1 online resource (242 pages) 300 $aIncludes index. 311 08$a3-95743-264-2 327 $aIntro -- Content -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Chapter 1. What is Special about First-Person Thought? -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The Essentiality of First-Person Thought - Messy Shoppers, Weird Attitudes and Attempts to Deal with Them -- 1.3 De Se Skepticism and the Action Inventory Model (AIM) -- 1.4 Restricting the Essentiality Thesis -- 1.5 Arguing Against the Action Inventory Model -- 1.6 Peculiarities of First-Person Thought and their Role for Action -- 1.6.1 The Necessary Double Reflexivity of First-Person Thought -- 1.6.2 The Effortlessness and Security of First-Person Thought -- 1.6.3 Excursus: Relational Awareness and Indexical Thought -- 1.6.4 Excursus: Relational Awareness and the Use of the First Person in Speech -- 1.7 The Motivational Force of First-Person Thought - A Research Desideratum? -- Chapter 2. Is the First Person Thick? -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Setting the Stage: Specifying the Thesis and Exposing its Historical Roots -- 2.3 What is Special about First-Person Concern? -- 2.4 Specifying the Nature of the Evaluative Component -- 2.5 Introspective Consciousness and Concern -- 2.6 Is Concern for One's Own Mental States Concern for Oneself? -- 2.7 Some Empirical Support -- 2.8 Concluding Remarks -- Chapter 3. Demystifying Immunity to Error through Misidentification -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Getting IEM right -- 3.2.1 Reference Failure and Errors through Misidentification -- 3.2.2 The Reasoning behind Errors through Misidentification -- 3.3 IEM as a Property of Thought Types? -- 3.4 IEM as a Property of Thought Tokens? -- 3.5 The Ubiquity of IEM as a Property of Thought Tokens -- 3.6 What about the Infallibility Intuition? -- 3.7 IEM and Subject-Centered Sources of Evidence -- 3.7.1 Subject-Centered Sources of Evidence and Property Possession -- 3.7.2 Subject-Centered Sources of Evidence, Immediacy and Identification. 327 $a3.7.3 Metaphysical IEM - Reviving Partial Infallibility -- 3.7.4 Resumé - What Can Be Gained from Metaphysical IEM? -- 3.7.5 Metaphysical IEM and its Relation to Self-Awareness and First-Person Thought -- 3.8 Concluding Remarks -- Chapter 4. Self-Identification and the Regress -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Shoemaker on Self-Identification -- 4.3 Which Conclusion to Draw? -- 4.4 Two Potential Issues with Shoemaker's Regress Argument -- 4.4.1 The Scope Problem -- 4.4.2 The Implausible Constraint Problem - Identification without Descriptive Beliefs? -- 4.5 How to Deal with these Worries? -- 4.5.1 The Scope Problem -- 4.5.2 The Implausible Constraint Problem -- 4.5.3 Some Consequences for the Relation between Self-Awareness and Perception -- Chapter 5. The Argument for Non-Conceptual Self-Consciousness -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The Argument Based on the Meaning of 'I' -- 5.3 Possible Objections to the Argument Based on the Meaning of 'I' -- 5.4 The Cognitive Role of Consciousness and Replies to the Objections -- 5.4.1 Preliminaries: The Mind-Body Relation -- 5.4.2 The Functional Correlates of Consciousness -- 5.4.3 Reply to the Objections -- 5.5 Concluding Remarks -- Chapter 6. How to Account for the Subjective Character of Experience? -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Self-Representationalism -- 6.2.1 From Higher-Order to Same-Order Representationalism -- 6.2.2 Self-Representationalism and the Subjective Character -- 6.3 Is the Subjective Character a Representational Content? -- 6.3.1 Do we Perceive Ourselves? -- 6.3.2 Can all Conscious Creatures Believe that they are? -- 6.3.3 Is the Subjective Character Something in Between? -- 6.4 Potential Issues of Self-Representationalism -- 6.5 The Concept of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness -- 6.6 Potential Issues of the Concept of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness -- 6.7 The Self-Mode of Experience. 327 $a6.7.1 The Subjective Character as a Way of Experiencing -- 6.7.2 What are Intentional Modes? -- 6.7.3 Justification - Is There a Place for Intentional Modes? -- 6.7.4 The Subjective Character as an Intentional Mode -- 6.8 The Evaluative Function of Modes - Subject Concerning Relations -- 6.9 Virtues of the Self-Mode Account -- 6.10 Concluding Remarks: Some Unresolved Questions and Objections -- Chapter 7. Conclusions -- Literature -- Index. 330 $aThe book offers new answers to two central questions that have been heavily debated, especially in recent years, in the debate on so-called de se skepticism: Is there something special about first-person thinking? And how does it relate to other forms of self-consciousness? The answer to the first question is a resounding "yes." This assertion is justified by the double-reflexive structure, motivational force, and specific concern that first-personal thinking involves. Regarding the second question, the book concludes that there are non-linguistic forms of self-consciousness. However, these should not be understood as representational contents or non-relational properties, but as mental relations that, without themselves being represented, can contribute to the phenomenal character of conscious states. In this respect, the book also provides a justification for the rarely considered impure intentionalism. 606 $aSelbstbewusstsein 606 $aBewusstsein 606 $aImmunität gegenüber Fehlern durch Fehlidentifikation 606 $aDe Se Skeptizismus 606 $aIndexikalische Gedanken 606 $aSelbstsorge 606 $aNicht-begriffliches Selbstbewusstsein 606 $aPrä-reflexivs Selbstbewusstsein 606 $aEmotionen 606 $aSelbst-Repräsentationalismus 606 $aSelf-Consciousness 606 $aConsciousness 606 $aImmunity to Error through Misidentification 606 $aDe Se Skepticism 606 $aIndexical Thought 606 $aSelf-Concern 606 $aNon-Conceptual Self-Consciousness 606 $aPre-reflective Self-Consciousness 606 $aEmotions 606 $aSelf-Representationalism 615 4$aSelbstbewusstsein 615 4$aBewusstsein 615 4$aImmunität gegenüber Fehlern durch Fehlidentifikation 615 4$aDe Se Skeptizismus 615 4$aIndexikalische Gedanken 615 4$aSelbstsorge 615 4$aNicht-begriffliches Selbstbewusstsein 615 4$aPrä-reflexivs Selbstbewusstsein 615 4$aEmotionen 615 4$aSelbst-Repräsentationalismus 615 4$aSelf-Consciousness 615 4$aConsciousness 615 4$aImmunity to Error through Misidentification 615 4$aDe Se Skepticism 615 4$aIndexical Thought 615 4$aSelf-Concern 615 4$aNon-Conceptual Self-Consciousness 615 4$aPre-reflective Self-Consciousness 615 4$aEmotions 615 4$aSelf-Representationalism 676 $a153 700 $aNiemeck$b Maik$4aut$01792937 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910972000003321 996 $aFirst-Person Thought$94415361 997 $aUNINA