LEADER 02126oam  22004093a 450 
001 9910703320203321
005 20230622022912.0
035   $a(NBER)w1838
035   $a(CKB)3240000000026014
035   $a(OCoLC)696173860
035   $a(EXLCZ)993240000000026014
100   $a20230622d1986      fy             0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aurcnu||||||||
181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
182   $cc$2rdamedia
183   $acr$2rdacarrier
200 10$aElections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles /$fKenneth Rogoff, Anne Sibert
210   $aCambridge, Mass$cNational Bureau of Economic Research$d1986
210  1$a[Washington, D.C.] :$c[Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System],$d[1985]
215   $a1 online resource$cillustrations (black and white);
225 1 $aNBER working paper series$vno. w1838
300   $aFebruary 1986.
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 35-36).
330 3 $aThere is an extensive empirical literature on political business cycles, but its theoretical foundations are grounded in pre-rational expectations macroeconomic theory. Here we show that electoral cycles in taxes, government spending and money growth can be modeled as an equilibrium signaling process. The cycleis driven by temporary information asymmetries which can arise if, for example,the government has more current information on its performance in providing for national defense. Incumbents cheat least when their private informationis either extremely favorable or extremely unfavorable. An exogenous increase in the incumbent partyts popularity does not necessarily imply a damped policy cycle.
410  0$aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)$vno. w1838.
606   $aElections$xEconomic aspects
615  0$aElections$xEconomic aspects.
700   $aRogoff$b Kenneth$0324217
701   $aSibert$b Anne$01366014
712 02$aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
801  0$bMaCbNBER
801  1$bMaCbNBER
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910703320203321
996   $aElections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles$93388458
997   $aUNINA