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100   $a20230622d2002      fy             0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aurcnu||||||||
181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
182   $cc$2rdamedia
183   $acr$2rdacarrier
200 10$aRicardian Equivalence with Incomplete Household Risk Sharing /$fShinichi Nishiyama, Kent Smetters
210   $aCambridge, Mass$cNational Bureau of Economic Research$d2002
210  1$aWashington, DC :$cCongressional Budget Office,$d[2002]
215   $a1 online resource$cillustrations (black and white);
225 1 $aNBER working paper series$vno. w8851
300   $aMarch 2002.
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references.
330 3 $aSeveral important empirical studies (e.g., Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff, 1992, 1996, 1997) find that households are not altruistically-linked in a way consistent with the standard Ricardian model, as put forward by Barro (1974). We build a two-sided altruistic-linkage model in which private transfers are made in the presence of two types of shocks: an 'observable' shock that is public information (e.g., public redistribution) and an 'unobservable' shock that is private information (e.g., idiosyncratic wages). Parents and children observe each other's total income but not each other's effort level. In the second-best optimum, unobservable shocks are only partially shared whereas, for any utility function satisfying a condition derived herein, observable shocks are fully shared. The model, therefore, can generate the low degree of risk sharing found in the recent studies, but Ricardian equivalence still holds.
410  0$aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)$vno. w8851.
606   $aFiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents$2jelc
615  7$aFiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
686   $aH3$2jelc
700   $aNishiyama$b Shinichi$01363569
701   $aSmetters$b Kent$0292064
712 02$aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
801  0$bMaCbNBER
801  1$bMaCbNBER
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910702926303321
996   $aRicardian Equivalence with Incomplete Household Risk Sharing$93389960
997   $aUNINA