LEADER 01102nam0-22003251i-450- 001 990006541440403321 005 20001010 035 $a000654144 035 $aFED01000654144 035 $a(Aleph)000654144FED01 035 $a000654144 100 $a20001010d--------km-y0itay50------ba 101 0 $aita 105 $ay-------001yy 200 1 $a<>Commissario parlamentare alla Difesa nella Repubblica Federale Tedesca$fIgnazio Faso$ga cura dell'Istituto per laDocumentazione e gli Studi Legislativi (ISLE) 210 $as.l.$cs.e.$ds.d. 215 $a695 p.$d22 cm - 300 $aEstratto da: "Rassegna parlamentare", (1967), n. 10-12. 676 $a349.43 700 1$aFaso,$bIgnazio$0238464 702 1$aISLE$9 801 0$aIT$bUNINA$gRICA$2UNIMARC 901 $aBK 912 $a990006541440403321 952 $aBUSTA I C 39$b10732$fFSPBC 952 $aBUSTA I C 11$b828$fFSPBC 959 $aFSPBC 996 $aCommissario parlamentare alla Difesa nella Repubblica Federale Tedesca$9619518 997 $aUNINA DB $aGEN01 LEADER 01035nam0-2200337---450- 001 990009909390403321 005 20141022154414.0 010 $a978-88-7916-496-2 035 $a000990939 035 $aFED01000990939 035 $a(Aleph)000990939FED01 035 $a000990939 100 $a20141022d2012----km-y0itay50------ba 101 0 $aita 102 $aIT 105 $aa-------001yy 200 1 $aAnalisi delle classi latenti di variabili psicosociali$emodelli, metodi, applicazioni$fEgidio Robusto, Francesca Cristante 210 $aMilano$cLED$d2012 215 $a141 p.$cill.$d21 cm 225 1 $aStrumenti e metodi per le scienze sociali 610 0 $aPsicometria 676 $a300.72$v22$zita 700 1$aRobusto,$bEgidio$0149748 701 1$aCristante,$bFrancesca$0128128 801 0$aIT$bUNINA$gREICAT$2UNIMARC 901 $aBK 912 $a990009909390403321 952 $aIX D 52$b49988$fFSPBC 959 $aFSPBC 996 $aAnalisi delle classi latenti di variabili psicosociali$9831721 997 $aUNINA LEADER 01424nam 2200349 n 450 001 996395230603316 005 20221107142526.0 035 $a(CKB)3810000000013745 035 $a(EEBO)2240909591 035 $a(UnM)9959181300971 035 $a(EXLCZ)993810000000013745 100 $a19910508d1582 uy 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurbn||||a|bb| 200 14$aThe Revelation of S. Ihon reueled, or, A paraphrase opening by conference of time and place such things as are both necessary, and profitable for the tyme present$b[electronic resource] /$fwriten in Latine by Iames Brocard, and Englished by Iames Sanford Gent 210 $aImprinted at London $cin Fleetestreate neare vnto S. Dunstones Church by Thomas Marshe$d1582 215 $a[1+] p 300 $aContains cropped ornamental border McK. 154. 300 $aA fragment; title page only. 300 $aReproduction of original in the British Library. 330 $aeebo-0018 608 $aTitle pages$zEngland$y16th cent. 700 $aBrocardo$b Iacopo$0973613 702 $aSandford$b James 801 0$bCu-RivES 801 1$bCu-RivES 801 2$bCStRLIN 801 2$bCu-RivES 906 $aBOOK 912 $a996395230603316 996 $aThe Revelation of S. Ihon reueled, or, A paraphrase opening by conference of time and place such things as are both necessary, and profitable for the tyme present$92332368 997 $aUNISA LEADER 03354oam 22004333a 450 001 9910702926203321 005 20230622022822.0 035 $a(NBER)w6430 035 $a(CKB)3240000000021829 035 $a(OCoLC)681741984 035 $a(EXLCZ)993240000000021829 100 $a20230622d1998 fy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aOpting Out of Social Security and Adverse Selection /$fLaurence J. Kotlikoff, Kent A. Smetters, Jan Walliser 210 $aCambridge, Mass$cNational Bureau of Economic Research$d1998 210 1$aWashington, DC :$cCongressional Budget Office,$d[1998] 215 $a1 online resource$cillustrations (black and white); 225 1 $aNBER working paper series$vno. w6430 300 $aFebruary 1998. 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 330 3 $aThis paper compares two general methods of privatization social security: forced participation in the new privatized system vs. letting people choose between the new system or staying in social security (i.e., opting out). Simulations are performed using a large scale perfect-foresight OLG simulation model that incorporates both intra-generational and inter-generational heterogeneity. The decision of any agent to opt out is endogenous and depends on the opting out decisions of all other agents vis-...-vis factor prices. Various tax bases are considered in financing the transition path, as well as the perceived tax-benefit linkage due to the informational problems inherent in many social security systems. We consider two cases: full and no perception Both methods of privatizing social security lead to large long- run gains for all lifetime income classes despite the intra-generational progressivity of social security, but differ in their short run effects due to adverse selection associated with opting out. Adverse selection is a key reason why many economists oppose opting out and why many plans to privatize social security systems mandate participation. This paper, however, shows this wisdom to be wide of the mark. Opting out is better at protecting the welfare of the initial elderly, even though forced participation protects their real value of social security benefits because opting out continues to collect payroll tax revenue from those who stay with social security. Opting out can mean quicker transition paths by reducing social security wealth faster than forced participation, because many will forfeit their accrued claims as the price of opting out. Yet opting out, along with a decrease in the payroll tax rate is better at shifting the burden to future workers who benefit from privatization. 410 0$aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)$vno. w6430. 606 $aSocial Security and Public Pensions$2jelc 615 7$aSocial Security and Public Pensions 686 $aH55$2jelc 700 $aKotlikoff$b Laurence J$0124852 701 $aSmetters$b Kent A$01363736 701 $aWalliser$b Jan$01143280 712 02$aNational Bureau of Economic Research. 801 0$bMaCbNBER 801 1$bMaCbNBER 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910702926203321 996 $aOpting Out of Social Security and Adverse Selection$93386778 997 $aUNINA