LEADER 02315oam 2200421 a 450 001 9910698803803321 005 20090608104855.0 035 $a(CKB)5470000002397832 035 $a(OCoLC)318620961 035 $a(EXLCZ)995470000002397832 100 $a20090416d2009 ua 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurmn||||a|||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aNuclear security$b[electronic resource] $ebetter oversight needed to ensure that security improvements at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory are fully implemented and sustained : report to congressional committees 210 1$a[Washington, D.C.] :$cU.S. Govt. Accountability Office,$d[2009] 215 $aii, 36 pages $cdigital, PDF file 300 $aTitle from title screen (viewed on Apr. 16, 2009). 300 $a"March 2009." 300 $a"GAO-09-321." 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 330 $aEnergy's (DOE) security inspection at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) found significant weaknesses, particularly in LLNL's protective force's ability to assure the protection of weapons-grade (special) nuclear material. LLNL is overseen by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within DOE, and managed by a contractor. NNSA is planning to remove most of the special nuclear material from LLNL. GAO was asked to (1) characterize security deficiencies identified in the 2008 inspection; (2) determine the factors that contributed to these deficiencies; (3) identify LLNL's corrective actions to address security deficiencies; and (4) assess LLNL's plan to permanently remove the riskiest special nuclear material from its site. 517 $aNuclear security 606 $aNuclear facilities$xSecurity measures$zUnited States 606 $aNuclear energy$xResearch$xLaboratories$xSecurity measures$zUnited States 606 $aNational security$zUnited States 615 0$aNuclear facilities$xSecurity measures 615 0$aNuclear energy$xResearch$xLaboratories$xSecurity measures 615 0$aNational security 801 0$bDID 801 1$bDID 801 2$bGPO 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910698803803321 996 $aNuclear security$93171215 997 $aUNINA