LEADER 03812oam 2200841 a 450 001 9910698791903321 005 20210217093527.0 035 $a(CKB)5470000002395934 035 $a(OCoLC)796020702$z(OCoLC)1001335460$z(OCoLC)1037522364 035 $a(OCoLC)995470000002395934 035 $a(EXLCZ)995470000002395934 100 $a20120621d2012 ua 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aBreaking the mishap chain $ehuman factors lessons learned from aerospace accidents and incidents in research, flight test, and development /$fPeter W. Merlin, Gregg A. Bendrick, Dwight A. Holland 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cNational Aeronautics and Space Administration,$d2012. 215 $a1 online resource (xv, 227 pages) $cillustrations 225 1 $aNASA aeronautics book series ;$v2011-594 300 $aTitle from title screen (viewed on June 21, 2012). 311 $a0-16-090414-5 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aPart 1. Design Factors -- "It May Not Be Hooked Up" : Automation Bias, Poor Communication, and Crew Resource Management Factors in the X-31Mishap -- Habit Pattern Transfer During the M2-F2 First Flight -- Pilot-Induced Oscillation During Space Shuttle Approach and Landing Tests -- Part 2. Physiological Factors -- Screening Versus Design : The X-15 Reentry Mishap -- Six Million Dollar Man : M2-F2 Task Saturation Mishap -- Almost-Loss of Consciousness in the F-22A Raptor -- Part 3. Organizational Factors -- Decision Chain Leading to the XB-70/F-104 Midair Collision -- Mission Management and Cockpit Resource Management in the B-1A Mishap -- Collision in Space : Human Factors in the Mir-Progress Mishap -- Conclusions. 517 $aBreaking the mishap chain 606 $aAircraft accidents$xHuman factors$vCase studies 606 $aResearch aircraft$xAccidents$vCase studies 606 $aSpace vehicle accidents$vCase studies 606 $aResearch aircraft$xDesign and construction$vCase studies 606 $aSpace vehicles$xDesign and construction$vCase studies 606 $aAeronautics$xResearch$vCase studies 606 $aFlight testing$vCase studies 606 $aAeronautics$xResearch$2fast 606 $aAircraft accidents$xHuman factors$2fast 606 $aFlight testing$2fast 606 $aResearch aircraft$xDesign and construction$2fast 606 $aSpace vehicle accidents$2fast 606 $aSpace vehicles$xDesign and construction$2fast 608 $aCase studies. 608 $aCase studies.$2fast 615 0$aAircraft accidents$xHuman factors 615 0$aResearch aircraft$xAccidents 615 0$aSpace vehicle accidents 615 0$aResearch aircraft$xDesign and construction 615 0$aSpace vehicles$xDesign and construction 615 0$aAeronautics$xResearch 615 0$aFlight testing 615 7$aAeronautics$xResearch. 615 7$aAircraft accidents$xHuman factors. 615 7$aFlight testing. 615 7$aResearch aircraft$xDesign and construction. 615 7$aSpace vehicle accidents. 615 7$aSpace vehicles$xDesign and construction. 676 $a363.12/414 700 $aMerlin$b Peter W.$f1964-$01351993 701 $aBendrick$b Gregg A$01370408 701 $aHolland$b Dwight A$01370409 712 02$aUnited States.$bNational Aeronautics and Space Administration. 801 0$bGPO 801 1$bGPO 801 2$bCOO 801 2$bOCLCQ 801 2$bOCLCA 801 2$bOCLCQ 801 2$bGILDS 801 2$bLWA 801 2$bOCLCF 801 2$bGPO 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910698791903321 996 $aBreaking the mishap chain$93398754 997 $aUNINA