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035   $a(NBER)w9471
035   $a(CKB)3240000000018645
035   $a(OCoLC)231687800
035   $a(EXLCZ)993240000000018645
100   $a20230622d2003      fy             0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aurcnu||||||||
181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
182   $cc$2rdamedia
183   $acr$2rdacarrier
200 10$aCompetition Among Hospitals /$fMartin Gaynor, William B. Vogt
210   $aCambridge, Mass$cNational Bureau of Economic Research$d2003
210  1$a[Washington, D.C.] :$c[Bureau of Economics, U.S. Federal Trade Commission],$d[2003]
215   $a1 online resource$cillustrations (black and white);
225 1 $aNBER working paper series$vno. w9471
300   $aFebruary 2003.
330 3 $aOur objective is to determine the effect of ownership type (for-profit, not-for-profit, government) on firm conduct in hospital markets. Secondary objectives include estimating hospital demand systems useful for market definition and merger simulation. To this end, we estimate a structural model of demand and pricing in the short term hospital industry in California, and then use the estimates to simulate the effect of a merger. Demand is modeled at the level of individual consumers using discrete choice techniques and micro data on individuals. Price in the demand equation is endogenous, and we use recently developed instrumental variables techniques to correct for this. We allow the behavior of for-profit and not-for-profit firms to differ, modeling these differences structurally following the relevant theory literature. We find that California hospitals in 1995 faced a downward-sloping demand for their products, with an average price elasticity of demand of -5.67. Not-for-profit hospitals face less elastic demand and have lower marginal costs. Their prices are lower, but markups are higher than those of for-profits. We simulate the effects of the 1997 merger of two hospital chains. In unconcentrated markets such as Los Angeles and San Diego, the merger has virtually no effect on prices. However, in San Luis Obispo County, where the merger creates a near monopoly, prices rise by up to 58%, and the predicted price increase would not be substantially smaller were the chains to be not-for-profit.
410  0$aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)$vno. w9471.
606   $aMarket Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance$2jelc
606   $aAntitrust Issues and Policies$2jelc
615  7$aMarket Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
615  7$aAntitrust Issues and Policies
686   $aL1$2jelc
686   $aL4$2jelc
700   $aGaynor$b Martin$0125959
701   $aVogt$b William B$0236684
712 02$aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
801  0$bMaCbNBER
801  1$bMaCbNBER
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910698306803321
996   $aCompetition Among Hospitals$93389956
997   $aUNINA