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100   $a20230622d1999      fy             0
101 0 $aeng
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181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
182   $cc$2rdamedia
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200 10$aExecutive Compensation$eSix Questions that Need Answering /$fJohn M. Abowd, David S. Kaplan
210   $aCambridge, Mass$cNational Bureau of Economic Research$d1999
210  1$a[Washington, D.C.] :$cU.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office of Employment Research and Program Development,$d[1998]
215   $a1 online resource$cillustrations (black and white);
225 1 $aNBER working paper series$vno. w7124
300   $aMay 1999.
330 3 $aIn this article, we focus on how recent research advances can be used to address the following six questions: (1) How much does executive compensation cost the firm? (2) How much is executive compensation worth to the recipient? (3) How well does executive compensation work? (4) What are the effects of executive compensation? (5) How much executive compensation is enough? (6) Could executive compensation be improved? We stress the formal link between executive pay and performance that is provided by stock options and equivalent forms of long term compensation. We compare executive compensation in 12 OECD countries for the period from 1984-1996. There are good reasons why the answers to the first two questions are different. Executive compensation research should be very careful to distinguish the concepts of employer cost and the value to the executive. Agency theory remains the only viable candidate for answering the question about how executive compensation works but the empirical research to date cannot explain very much about the structure of the optimal contract. For this reason, it is also hard to answer the questions about the effects of executive compensation and the adequacy of the amounts of executive compensation, although it is clear that companies can provide both too little and too much contingent compensation, in the context of agency theory. We suggest two fertile areas for research regarding the improvement of executive compensation.
410  0$aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)$vno. w7124.
517   $aExecutive Compensation
606   $aCompensation Packages ? Payment Methods$2jelc
606   $aCorporate Finance and Governance$2jelc
615  7$aCompensation Packages ? Payment Methods
615  7$aCorporate Finance and Governance
686   $aJ33$2jelc
686   $aG3$2jelc
700   $aAbowd$b John M$0125329
701   $aKaplan$b David S$0282937
712 02$aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
801  0$bMaCbNBER
801  1$bMaCbNBER
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910698306703321
996   $aExecutive Compensation$93389955
997   $aUNINA