LEADER 03692oam 2200637 a 450 001 9910694330503321 005 20110503093958.0 035 $a(CKB)5470000002362751 035 $a(OCoLC)173666345 035 $a(EXLCZ)995470000002362751 100 $a20071004d2007 ua 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurbn||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aAmerican grand strategy for Latin America in the age of resentment /$fGabriel Marcella 210 1$a[Carlisle Barracks, PA] :$c[Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College],$d[2007] 215 $avi, 65 pages $cdigital, PDF file 225 1 $aSecurity Issues in the Western Hemisphere 300 $aTitle from title screen (viewed Jan. 16, 2007). 300 $a"September 2007." 311 08$a9781584873105 311 08$a1584873108 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 54-65). 327 $aIntroduction -- Interpretation of an enduring metaphor -- Evolutionary signposts -- Introspect -- The crossroads -- Conclusion. 330 0 $aSince the 1980s, the US military has placed great emphasis on the theories and concepts of Clausewitz. Concomitantly, a tremendous emphasis has been placed in doctrine on the consideration of a center of gravity (COG) as a central element of campaign planning. The doctrinal definitions of the COG are still imperfect, but the concept arguably serves as an effective tool for focusing military effort to win decisively in major operations or campaigns. Although the American military performs brilliantly in decisive operations, the difficulties it has faced in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that a doctrinal renaissance is in order. This paper examines the potential for employing the COG concept in areas beyond the realm of decisive operations. After examining the concept's evolution, present doctrinal manifestations, and some previous proposals for future employment, the author opines that the COG's role in American military thinking is flawed and must be reconsidered entirely. To that end, three options are offered for evolving the COG, with a specific recommendation that it would be most effective if removed from doctrine and considered as an abstract concept, rather than a practical one. 606 $aMilitary doctrine$zUnited States$xEvaluation 606 $aStrategy$xEvaluation 606 $aMilitary planning$zUnited States$xEvaluation 606 $aDoctrines militaires$zE?tats-Unis$xE?valuation 606 $aStrate?gie$xE?valuation 606 $aPlanification militaire$zE?tats-Unis$xE?valuation 606 $aInfluence (Literary, artistic, etc.)$2fast$3(OCoLC)fst00972484 606 $aMilitary planning$xEvaluation$2fast$3(OCoLC)fst01021378 607 $aLatin America$xPolitics and government$y1980- 607 $aUnited States$xRelations$zLatin America 607 $aLatin America$xRelations$zUnited States 615 0$aMilitary doctrine$xEvaluation. 615 0$aStrategy$xEvaluation. 615 0$aMilitary planning$xEvaluation. 615 6$aDoctrines militaires$xE?valuation. 615 6$aStrate?gie$xE?valuation. 615 6$aPlanification militaire$xE?valuation. 615 7$aInfluence (Literary, artistic, etc.) 615 7$aMilitary planning$xEvaluation. 700 $aMarcella$b Gabriel$01070828 712 02$aArmy War College (U.S.).$bStrategic Studies Institute. 801 0$bGPO 801 1$bGPO 801 2$bGAO 801 2$bGPO 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910694330503321 996 $aAmerican grand strategy for Latin America in the age of resentment$93492580 997 $aUNINA