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181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
182   $cc$2rdamedia
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200 12$aA concept at the crossroads$b[electronic resource] $erethinking the center of gravity /$fRudolph M. Janiczek
210  1$aCarlisle, PA :$cStrategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,$d[2007]
215   $av, 12 pages $cdigital, PDF file
225 1 $aCarlisle papers in security strategy
300   $aTitle from title screen (viewed on Oct. 30, 2007).
300   $a"October 2007."
311   $a1-58487-322-1 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 10-12).
327   $aIntroduction -- Interpretation of an enduring metaphor -- Evolutionary signposts -- Introspect -- The crossroads -- Conclusion.
330 0 $aSince the 1980s, the US military has placed great emphasis on the theories and concepts of Clausewitz. Concomitantly, a tremendous emphasis has been placed in doctrine on the consideration of a center of gravity (COG) as a central element of campaign planning. The doctrinal definitions of the COG are still imperfect, but the concept arguably serves as an effective tool for focusing military effort to win decisively in major operations or campaigns. Although the American military performs brilliantly in decisive operations, the difficulties it has faced in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that a doctrinal renaissance is in order. This paper examines the potential for employing the COG concept in areas beyond the realm of decisive operations. After examining the concept's evolution, present doctrinal manifestations, and some previous proposals for future employment, the author opines that the COG's role in American military thinking is flawed and must be reconsidered entirely. To that end, three options are offered for evolving the COG, with a specific recommendation that it would be most effective if removed from doctrine and considered as an abstract concept, rather than a practical one.
517   $aConcept at the crossroads 
606   $aMilitary doctrine$zUnited States$xEvaluation
606   $aStrategy$xEvaluation
606   $aMilitary planning$zUnited States$xEvaluation
615  0$aMilitary doctrine$xEvaluation.
615  0$aStrategy$xEvaluation.
615  0$aMilitary planning$xEvaluation.
700   $aJaniczek$b Rudolph M$01421688
712 02$aArmy War College (U.S.).$bStrategic Studies Institute.
801  0$bGPO
801  1$bGPO
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910694329803321
996   $aA concept at the crossroads$93543682
997   $aUNINA