LEADER 01292cam0-22004331i-450- 001 990003797980403321 005 20110923202405.0 010 $a88-430-0546-4 035 $a000379798 035 $aFED01000379798 035 $a(Aleph)000379798FED01 035 $a000379798 100 $a20030910d1997----km-y0itay50------ba 101 0 $aita 102 $aIT 105 $ay-------001yy 200 1 $aAntropologia del turismo$estrategie di ricerca e contesti etnografici$fAlessandro Simonicca 210 $aRoma$cLa Nuova Italia Scientifica$d1997 215 $a298 p.$d22 cm 225 1 $aBiblioteca di testi e studi$iAntropologia$v37 300 $aContiene bibl. e indice dei nomi 610 0 $aTurismo$aAspetti antropologici 610 0 $aTurismo$aAspetti socio-culturali 610 0 $aViaggi$aSec. 20. 676 $a306.481 2 676 $a338.479 1 676 $a306.48$v21$zita 700 1$aSimonicca,$bAlessandro$0141904 801 0$aIT$bUNINA$gRICA$2UNIMARC 901 $aBK 912 $a990003797980403321 952 $a306.4812 SIM 1$b6650$fBFS 952 $aCOLLEZ. 1587 (37)$b31250$fFSPBC 952 $a306.48 SIM 1$bBibl. 29155$fFLFBC 959 $aBFS 959 $aFSPBC 959 $aFLFBC 996 $aAntropologia del turismo$993256 997 $aUNINA LEADER 04919oam 2200601zu 450 001 9910693723703321 005 20250717214741.0 035 $a(CKB)1000000000729405 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000352427 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12144450 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000352427 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10284792 035 $a(PQKB)11295079 035 $a(OCoLC)54463583 035 9 $aocm54463583 035 $a(OCoLC)991000000000729405 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000729405 100 $a20160829d2004 uy 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurmn|||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 00$aChecking Iran's nuclear ambitions 210 31$a[Place of publication not identified]$cStrategic Studies Institute U S Army War College$d2004 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aChecking Iran's nuclear ambitions, report recommendations / NPEC Project on Iran -- Iran's "legal" paths to the bomb / Victor Gilinsky -- Iran's internal struggles / Geneive Abdo -- The prospects for regime change in Iran / S. Rob Sobhani -- Winning Iranian hearts and minds / Abbas William Samii -- U.S.-Iranian strategic cooperation since 1979 / Geoffrey Kemp -- The challenges of U.S. preventive military action / Michael Eisenstadt. 330 $aWere Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, there is a grave risk it would be tempted to provide them to terrorists. After all, mass casualty terrorism done by proxies has worked well for Iran to date. The fear about what Iran might do with nuclear weapons is fed by the concern that Tehran has no clear reason to be pursuing nuclear weapons. The strategic rationale for Iran's nuclear program is by no means obvious. Unlike proliferators such as Israel or Pakistan, Iran faces no historic enemy who would welcome an opportunity to wipe the state off the face of the earth. Iran is encircled by troubled neighbors, but nuclear weapons does nothing to help counter the threats that could come from state collapse in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, or Azerbaijan. Achieving trans-Atlantic consensus on how to respond to Iran's nuclear program will be difficult. This is a remarkably bad time for the international community to face the Iran nuclear problem, because the tensions about the Iraq WMD issue still poison relations and weaken U.S. ability to respond. Nevertheless, Iran's nuclear program poses a stark challenge to the international nonproliferation regime. There is no doubt that Iran is developing worrisome capabilities. If the world community led by Western countries is unable to prevent Iranian proliferation, then it is unclear that there is much meaning to global nonproliferation norms. Iran's nuclear program raises stark shortcomings with the global nonproliferation norms. The basic deal behind the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is that countries are allowed to acquire a wide range of troubling capabilities in return for being open and transparent. The NPT gives Iran every right to have a full closed fuel cycle, with large uranium enrichment facilities and a reprocessing plant that can extract substantial amounts of plutonium-capabilities which would permit Iran at any time to rapidly "break out" of the NPT, building a considerable number of nuclear weapons in a short time. Had Iran been fully transparent about its nuclear activities, then even if Iran had gone so far as to operate a full closed fuel cycle, the international community would have been split deeply about how to react. It is fortunate indeed that Iran decided to cheat on its NPT obligations by hiding some of what is doing, because that has made much easier the construction of an international consensus that Iran's nuclear program is troubling. But the experience with Iran should lead to reflection about whether the basic NPT deal needs to be revisited. 606 $aNuclear weapons$xInternational cooperation$zIran 606 $aNuclear nonproliferation$zIran 606 $aNuclear arms control 606 $aArmies$2HILCC 606 $aMilitary & Naval Science$2HILCC 606 $aLaw, Politics & Government$2HILCC 607 $aIran$xMilitary policy 607 $aIran$xPolitics and government$y1997- 607 $aUnited States$xMilitary policy 615 0$aNuclear weapons$xInternational cooperation 615 0$aNuclear nonproliferation 615 0$aNuclear arms control. 615 7$aArmies 615 7$aMilitary & Naval Science 615 7$aLaw, Politics & Government 676 $a327.1/747/0955 702 $aSokolski$b Henry D. 702 $aClawson$b Patrick$f1951- 712 02$aArmy War College (U.S.) Strategic Studies Institute, 801 0$bPQKB 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910693723703321 996 $aChecking Iran's nuclear ambitions$93173235 997 $aUNINA