LEADER 02449oam 2200577zu 450 001 9910693430803321 005 20210803233114.0 035 $a(CKB)3360000000004331 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000603768 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12293664 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000603768 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10574491 035 $a(PQKB)11264646 035 $a(OCoLC)461002144 035 $a(EXLCZ)993360000000004331 100 $a20160829d2009 uy 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurbn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aEscalation and intrawar deterrence during limited wars in the Middle East 210 31$a[Place of publication not identified]$cStrategic Studies Institute U S Army War College$d2009 215 $a1 online resource (xiii, 112 pages) 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a1-58487-406-6 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 95-112). 330 $aThis monograph analyzes military escalation and intrawar deterrence by examining two key wars where these concepts became especially relevant: the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq. A central conclusion of this monograph is that intrawar deterrence is an inherently fragile concept, and that the nonuse of weapons of mass destruction in both wars was the result of a number of positive factors that may not be repeated in future conflicts. 606 $aEscalation (Military science)$y1967-1973$vCase studies 606 $aDeterrence (Strategy)$vCase studies 606 $aArab-Israeli conflict 606 $aPersian Gulf War, 1991 606 $aMilitary & Naval Science$2HILCC 606 $aLaw, Politics & Government$2HILCC 606 $aMilitary Science - General$2HILCC 607 $aMiddle East$xStrategic aspects 615 0$aEscalation (Military science) 615 0$aDeterrence (Strategy) 615 0$aArab-Israeli conflict 615 0$aPersian Gulf War, 1991 615 7$aMilitary & Naval Science 615 7$aLaw, Politics & Government 615 7$aMilitary Science - General 676 $a956.04/8 700 $aTerrill$b W. Andrew$01070829 712 02$aArmy War College (U.S.) Strategic Studies Institute, 801 0$bPQKB 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910693430803321 996 $aEscalation and intrawar deterrence during limited wars in the Middle East$93204941 997 $aUNINA