LEADER 03477nam 2200421 450 001 9910637789203321 005 20230327172700.0 035 $a(CKB)5470000001631645 035 $a(NjHacI)995470000001631645 035 $a(EXLCZ)995470000001631645 100 $a20230327d2022 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 00$aFrom warlords to statelords $earmed groups and power trajectories in Libya and Yemen /$fedited by Eleonora Ardemagni, Federica Saini Fasanotti ; introduction by Paolo Magri 210 1$aMilan, Italy :$cLedizioni,$d[2022] 210 4$dİ2022 215 $a1 online resource (126 pages) $cmaps 311 $a88-5526-813-9 327 $aIntroduction, Paolo Magri - ISPI Executive Vice President -- 1. Libya and Yemen's warlords: neopatirmonialsm under a new guise. Eleonora Ardemagni - ISPI and Catholic University of Milan -- 2. The lords of war in the changing geopolitical system. Vanda Felbab-Brown - Brookings Institution -- 3. Armed groups, oil revenue and energy infrastructure -- 3.1 Libya's Shadow Statelords: War, Peace and the Predation of the Oil Sector, Anas El-Gomati - Sadeq Institute -- 3.2 Old Elites and New Armed Groups: The Scramble Over Yemen's Oil Reserves Continues, Ahmed al-Shargabi, Mareike Transfeld - Yemen Policy Center 4. Armed groups, smuggling and illicit trafficking -- 4.1 The Lifeblood of Libya: Armed Groups' Normalisation of a Thriving Smuggling Economy, Amanda B. Kadlec - King's College London -- 4.2. Yemen: Militarised Borders Strengthen Smuggling Networks, Ahmed Nagi - Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center -- 5. Libya and Yemen's governance of maritime boundaries -- 5.1 How Mafiaisation Destabilises Libya's Economy and Migration Control, Tarek Megerisi - European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) -- 5.2 Yemen's Coastal Lords: The Economics of "Multi-Governed" Maritime Boundaries, Eleonora Ardemagni - ISPI and Catholic University of Milan -- Conclusions: How militias became proto-governments. Federica Saini Fasanotti - ISPI and Brookings Institution -- About the authors. 330 $aArmed groups play a central role in Libya and Yemen. Pervading weak and contested institutions, they have gradually brought their survival, profit and governance strategies under the state umbrella: warlords have become the new lords of the state. Armed groups control most of the energy revenues, critical infrastructure, smuggling and illicit trafficking. Their leaders are multifaceted: they are simultaneously military commanders, tribal chiefs, politicians and businessmen. Combining comparative analysis and case studies, this Report sheds light on the "economic face" of the armed groups and their power trajectories. How do armed groups build networks of profit and loyalty in the territories they hold? How does clientelism mark a continuity trend with former authoritarian regimes? 517 $aFrom Warlords to Statelords 606 $aWarlordism 607 $aLibya$xPolitics and government 607 $aYemen (Republic)$xPolitics and government 615 0$aWarlordism. 676 $a364.13 702 $aArdemagni$b Eleonora 702 $aFasanotti$b Federica Sain 702 $aMagri$b Paolo 801 0$bNjHacI 801 1$bNjHacl 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910637789203321 996 $aFrom warlords to statelords$93086441 997 $aUNINA