LEADER 03236nam 22005055 450 001 9910634039503321 005 20251008152002.0 010 $a9783031164231 010 $a3031164237 024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-031-16423-1 035 $a(PPN)283353317 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC7156879 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL7156879 035 $a(CKB)25703777500041 035 $a(DE-He213)978-3-031-16423-1 035 $a(EXLCZ)9925703777500041 100 $a20221212d2023 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aMobilization Constraints and Military Privatization $eThe Political Cost-Effectiveness of Outsourcing Security /$fby Eugenio Cusumano 205 $a1st ed. 2023. 210 1$aCham :$cSpringer International Publishing :$cImprint: Palgrave Macmillan,$d2023. 215 $a1 online resource (251 pages) 311 08$a9783031164224 311 08$a3031164229 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $a1. Introduction -- 2. Military Privatization and State Power in Historical Perspective -- 3. Domestic Political Constraints and Contractor Support to Military Operations: a new Theoretical Framework -- 4. Mobilization Constraints and Military Privatization in the United States -- 5. Mobilization Constraints and Military Privatization in the United Kingdom -- 6. Military Mobilization Constraints and Military Privatization in Italy -- 7. Effectiveness, Norms, and Military Cultures: Assessing Mobilization Constraints against Competing Explanations -- 8. Conclusions. 330 $aThis book investigates the connection between tightening mobilization constraints and the use of PMSCs in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Drawing on neoclassical realism and institutionalist theory, it conceptualizes democracies? use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) as an attempt to circumvent the tightening constraints on the mobilization of military power. The use of private military contractors is less subjected to parliamentary restrictions and less visible to public opinion than the deployment of soldiers. Rather than cheaper in financial terms, PMSCs are therefore politically cost-effective, as they enable decision-makers to minimize the institutional obstacles on conducting military operations and the electoral costs attached thereto. The need to reduce the ex ante hurdles and the ex post costs of military deployments fills the blind spots of alternative explanations for the use of PMSCs based on effectiveness, ideology, and organizational interests. Eugenio Cusumano is Associate Professor of political science at the University of Messina, Italy. 606 $aSecurity, International 606 $aInternational Security Studies 615 0$aSecurity, International. 615 14$aInternational Security Studies. 676 $a658.47 676 $a355.35 700 $aCusumano$b Eugenio$0945296 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910634039503321 996 $aMobilization Constraints and Military Privatization$94334602 997 $aUNINA