LEADER 01211nam0-22003491i-450- 001 990000497390403321 005 20090302124012.0 010 $a0-444-99769-5 035 $a000049739 035 $aFED01000049739 035 $a(Aleph)000049739FED01 035 $a000049739 100 $a20020821d1979----km-y0itay50------ba 101 0 $aeng 105 $aa-------101yy 200 1 $aCharge storage, charge transport and electrostatics with their applications$fedited by Yasaku Wada, M. M Perlman, Hiroshi Kokado 210 $aTokyo$cKodansha$aAmsterdam$cElsevier scientific publishing$d1979 215 $a441 p.$cill.$d25 cm 225 1 $aStudies in electrical and electronic engineering$v2 610 0 $aElettrostatica$aCongressi 676 $a537.2 702 1$aWada,$bYasaku 702 1$aKokado,$bHiroshi 702 1$aPerlman,$bM. M. 710 12$aInternational workshop on electric charges in dielectrics$f<1978 ;$eKyoto>$0491882 801 0$aIT$bUNINA$gRICA$2UNIMARC 901 $aBK 912 $a990000497390403321 952 $a10 PRO 372$bL/15 CNR$fDINEL 959 $aDINEL 996 $aCharge storage, charge transport and electrostatics with their applications$9333121 997 $aUNINA LEADER 01458nas 2200457- 450 001 9910140654503321 005 20240129213017.0 035 $a(DE-599)ZDB2051865-1 035 $a(OCoLC)45242240 035 $a(CKB)110978966553448 035 $a(CONSER)--2005264585 035 $a(EXLCZ)99110978966553448 100 $a20001027a19699999 s-- - 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 04$aThe Harvard political review 210 1$aCambridge, Mass. :$cHarvard political review,$d1969- 210 31$aCambridge, MA :$cInstitute of Politics 300 $a"A journal of fact and opinion." 311 $a0090-1032 517 1 $aHPR online 517 1 $aHPR 517 1 $aHarvard political review online 606 $aPolitical science$vPeriodicals 606 $aPolitics and government$2fast$3(OCoLC)fst01919741 606 $aPolitical science$2fast$3(OCoLC)fst01069781 607 $aUnited States$xPolitics and government$vPeriodicals 607 $aUnited States$2fast 608 $aPeriodicals.$2fast 615 0$aPolitical science 615 7$aPolitics and government 615 7$aPolitical science. 676 $a320.473/049 712 02$aJohn F. Kennedy School of Government.$bInstitute of Politics. 906 $aJOURNAL 912 $a9910140654503321 996 $aThe Harvard political review$91937798 997 $aUNINA LEADER 03236nam 22005055 450 001 9910634039503321 005 20251008152002.0 010 $a9783031164231 010 $a3031164237 024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-031-16423-1 035 $a(PPN)283353317 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC7156879 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL7156879 035 $a(CKB)25703777500041 035 $a(DE-He213)978-3-031-16423-1 035 $a(EXLCZ)9925703777500041 100 $a20221212d2023 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aMobilization Constraints and Military Privatization $eThe Political Cost-Effectiveness of Outsourcing Security /$fby Eugenio Cusumano 205 $a1st ed. 2023. 210 1$aCham :$cSpringer International Publishing :$cImprint: Palgrave Macmillan,$d2023. 215 $a1 online resource (251 pages) 311 08$a9783031164224 311 08$a3031164229 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $a1. Introduction -- 2. Military Privatization and State Power in Historical Perspective -- 3. Domestic Political Constraints and Contractor Support to Military Operations: a new Theoretical Framework -- 4. Mobilization Constraints and Military Privatization in the United States -- 5. Mobilization Constraints and Military Privatization in the United Kingdom -- 6. Military Mobilization Constraints and Military Privatization in Italy -- 7. Effectiveness, Norms, and Military Cultures: Assessing Mobilization Constraints against Competing Explanations -- 8. Conclusions. 330 $aThis book investigates the connection between tightening mobilization constraints and the use of PMSCs in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Drawing on neoclassical realism and institutionalist theory, it conceptualizes democracies? use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) as an attempt to circumvent the tightening constraints on the mobilization of military power. The use of private military contractors is less subjected to parliamentary restrictions and less visible to public opinion than the deployment of soldiers. Rather than cheaper in financial terms, PMSCs are therefore politically cost-effective, as they enable decision-makers to minimize the institutional obstacles on conducting military operations and the electoral costs attached thereto. The need to reduce the ex ante hurdles and the ex post costs of military deployments fills the blind spots of alternative explanations for the use of PMSCs based on effectiveness, ideology, and organizational interests. Eugenio Cusumano is Associate Professor of political science at the University of Messina, Italy. 606 $aSecurity, International 606 $aInternational Security Studies 615 0$aSecurity, International. 615 14$aInternational Security Studies. 676 $a658.47 676 $a355.35 700 $aCusumano$b Eugenio$0945296 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910634039503321 996 $aMobilization Constraints and Military Privatization$94334602 997 $aUNINA