LEADER 05162nam 2200433 450 001 9910633915203321 005 20230404060954.0 010 $a9783031108044$b(electronic bk.) 010 $z9783031108037 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC7151638 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL7151638 035 $a(CKB)25554139500041 035 $a(EXLCZ)9925554139500041 100 $a20230404d2022 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aEquity, efficiency, and ethics in remedies for breach of contract $etheory and experimental evidence /$fSergio Mittlaender 210 1$aCham, Switzerland :$cSpringer,$d[2022] 210 4$d©2022 215 $a1 online resource (241 pages) 225 1 $aInternational law and economics (Springer (Firm)) 311 08$aPrint version: Mittlaender, Sergio Equity, Efficiency, and Ethics in Remedies for Breach of Contract Cham : Springer International Publishing AG,c2023 9783031108037 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aIntro -- Foreword -- Acknowledgements -- List of Legal Materials Cited -- American Case Law -- British Case Law -- Contents -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Objective -- 1.2 Research Questions -- 1.3 Outline -- 2 Theories of Contract and Contract Law -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.1.1 The Legal Concept of Contract in Common and Civil Law Systems -- 2.1.2 Legal Enforcement of Contracts in Common and Civil Law Systems -- 2.2 Promissory Theories -- 2.3 Reliance Theories -- 2.4 Economic Theories -- 2.4.1 Anticipation of Opportunism and the Protection of the Restitution Interest -- 2.4.2 Loss of Reliance Investments and the Protection of the Reliance Interest -- 2.4.3 The Theory of Efficient Breach and the Protection of the Expectation Interest -- 2.4.4 The Role of Compensatory Remedies in Economic Theories -- 2.5 Conclusion -- 3 Disagreement, Conflict, and Retaliation in Breach of Contract -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Contractual Disputes and the Incompleteness of Contracts -- 3.3 Disagreement on the Moral Value of Breach -- 3.4 Disagreement on the Harmful Consequences of Breach -- 3.5 Cognitive Biases that Facilitate Disagreement -- 3.6 Retaliation to Perceived Wrong as the Product of Disagreement -- 3.7 Conclusion -- 4 Reciprocity and Legal Relief in Breach of Contract -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Retaliation and Punishment in Experiments -- 4.2.1 Retaliation in Experimental Games -- 4.2.2 Retaliation to Breach of Contract -- 4.3 Retaliation in the Contractual Model -- 4.4 Aggrievement from Breach and Possible Causes of Retaliation -- 4.4.1 Loss of Expected and Promised Gains -- 4.4.2 Inequality from Breach -- 4.4.3 Inefficiency from Breach -- 4.5 Social Welfare and Retaliation to Breach -- 4.5.1 Social Costs and Benefits of Retaliation under Perfect Legal Enforcement -- 4.5.2 Social Costs and Benefits of Retaliation under Imperfect Legal Enforcement. 327 $a4.6 Conclusion -- 5 Retaliation, Remedies, and Contracts -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Partie's Behavior Under Investigation and Related Literature -- 5.3 The Empirical Study -- 5.3.1 The Implemented Trade Game -- 5.3.2 Experimental Treatments -- 5.3.3 Strict Rational Choice Predictions -- 5.3.4 Alternative Hypotheses -- 5.3.5 Experimental Procedure -- 5.4 Results -- 5.4.1 Descriptive Results -- 5.4.2 Regression Results -- 5.4.3 Analysis of Social Welfare -- 5.5 Conclusion -- 6 Implications and Normative Analysis of Remedies for Breach -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Damages for Breach -- 6.2.1 The Protection of the Expectation Interest in Common Law and Civil Law Systems -- 6.2.2 Social Welfare Under Expectation Damages -- 6.2.3 The Protection of the Disgorgement Interest in Common Law and Civil Law Systems -- 6.2.4 Social Welfare Under Disgorgement Damages in the Absence of Renegotiation -- 6.2.5 Social Welfare Under Disgorgement Damages in the Presence of Renegotiation -- 6.3 Specific Performance -- 6.3.1 Specific Performance in Common and Civil Law Systems -- 6.3.2 Limits of a Claim to Specific Performance -- 6.3.3 Social Welfare Under Specific Performance in the Absence of Renegotiation -- 6.3.4 Social Welfare Under Specific Performance in the Presence of Renegotiation -- 6.4 Normative Analysis -- 6.4.1 The American Insistence on Expectation Damages -- 6.4.2 The French Expansion of Specific Performance with Astreintes -- 6.4.3 The German Junction of Specific Performance, Expectation, and Disgorgement Damages -- 6.4.4 The British Acceptance of Partial Disgorgement (Hypothetical Bargain Damages) -- 6.5 Conclusion -- 7 Conclusion -- Bibliography. 410 0$aInternational law and economics (Springer (Firm)) 606 $aBreach of contract. 615 0$aBreach of contract. . 676 $a346.022 700 $aMittlaender$b Sergio$01271086 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 912 $a9910633915203321 996 $aEquity, Efficiency, and Ethics in Remedies for Breach of Contract$92994402 997 $aUNINA