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101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|||||||||||
181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
182   $cc$2rdamedia
183   $acr$2rdacarrier
200 00$aRecent Advances in Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games /$fedited by Ananish Chaudhuri
210  1$aBasel :$cMDPI - Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute,$d2016.
215   $a1 online resource (xxiv, 241 pages) $cillustrations
311   $a3-03842-231-2 
327   $aFraming and feedback in social dilemmas with partners and strangers / Caleb A. Cox and Brock Stoddard -- Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games / Juan Camilo Ca?rdenas, Ce?sar Mantilla and Rajiv Sethi -- Representing others in a public good game / Karen Evelyn Hauge and Ole Rogeberg -- The role of the decision-making regime on cooperation in a workgroup social dilemma: an examination of cyberloafing / Brice Corgnet, Roberto Herna?n-Gonza?lez and Matthew W. McCarter -- Pledges of commitment and cooperation in partnerships / Lachlan Deer and Ralph-C. Bayer -- Alleviation and sanctions in social dilemma games / Michalis Drouvelis -- Students, temporary workers and co-op workers: an experimental investigation on social preferences / Davide Dragone, Fabio Galeotti, and Raimondello Orsini -- The loser's bliss in auctions with price externality / Ernan Haruvy and Peter T.L. Popkowski Leszczyc -- Reciprocity in labor market relationships: evidence from an experiment across high-income OECD countries / Israel Waichman, Ch'ng Kean Siang, Till Requate, Aric P. Shafran, Eva Camacho-Cuena, Yoshio Iida and Shosh Shahrabani -- Partner selection and the division of surplus: evidence from ultimatum and dictator experiments / Priyodorshi Banerjee, Sujoy Chakravarty, and Sanmitra Ghosh.
330   $a"The articles in this volume collectively represent the latest advances in how people think of social dilemma problems, how we may be able to enhance cooperation and reduce free-riding in such problems and how we can extend the lessons learned to a host of other similar issues facing us. We have learned, for instance, that a "take" frame does not necessarily lead to lower cooperation compared to a "give" frame but combining a "take" frame with a fine-grained individual level feedback leads to more extreme behavior in terms of both greater cooperation and greater free-riding. We have also learned that a strategy based on payoff sampling may provide a more parsimonious and less paramter dependent way of modeling behavior in common pool resource extraction games. We find that people behave differently in social dilemmas when making decisions of their own as opposed to deciding on the behalf of someone else"--$cAmazon.com.
606   $aGame theory
606   $aSocial problems
615  0$aGame theory.
615  0$aSocial problems.
676   $a519.3
702   $aChaudhuri$b Ananish
801  0$bNjHacI
801  1$bNjHacl
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910598051803321
996   $aRecent Advances in Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games$92929715
997   $aUNINA