LEADER 05750nam 2200529 450 001 9910556883503321 005 20231110212422.0 010 $a3-030-92871-3 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC6941323 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL6941323 035 $a(CKB)21435622300041 035 $a(PPN)261518399 035 $a(EXLCZ)9921435622300041 100 $a20221110d2022 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aEconomics of power systems /$fMakoto Tanaka, Antonio J. Conejo, and Afzal S. Siddiqui 210 1$aCham, Switzerland :$cSpringer,$d[2022] 210 4$dİ2022 215 $a1 online resource (327 pages) 225 1 $aInternational Series in Operations Research and Management Science ;$vv.327 311 08$aPrint version: Tanaka, Makoto Economics of Power Systems Cham : Springer International Publishing AG,c2022 9783030928704 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aIntro -- Preface -- Contents -- 1 Demand -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Utility -- 1.2.1 Utility Function -- 1.2.2 Quadratic Utility Function -- 1.3 Demand for Goods -- 1.3.1 Utility Maximization and Demand Function -- 1.3.2 Linear Demand Function -- 1.3.3 Substitutes and Complements -- 1.4 Elasticity -- 1.4.1 Price Elasticity of Demand -- 1.4.2 Elasticity for Linear Demand -- 1.4.3 Various Cases of Elasticity -- 1.5 Consumer Surplus -- 1.5.1 Gross Benefit and Consumer Surplus -- 1.5.2 Maximizing Consumer Surplus -- 1.6 Demand Aggregation -- 1.6.1 Market Demand -- 1.6.2 Aggregation of Consumer Surplus -- 1.7 Demand Response -- 1.8 Prosumer -- 1.9 Summary -- 1.10 End-of-Chapter Exercises -- References -- 2 Supply -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Operating Costs -- 2.2.1 Calculating Operating Costs -- 2.2.2 Short-Run Supply Stack -- 2.2.3 Economic Dispatch -- 2.3 Investment Costs -- 2.3.1 Calculating Levelized Costs -- 2.3.2 Screening Curves -- 2.3.3 Investment Planning -- 2.4 Profit Maximization -- 2.4.1 Short-Run Profit Maximization -- 2.4.2 Long-Run Profit Maximization -- 2.5 Variable Renewable Energy Sources -- 2.6 Energy Storage -- 2.7 Summary -- 2.8 End-of-Chapter Exercises -- 2.9 GAMS Codes -- References -- 3 Market Clearing -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Day-Ahead Market -- 3.2.1 Single-Node Single-Period Auction -- 3.2.2 Single-Node Multi-Period Auction -- 3.2.3 Network-Constrained Single-Period Auction -- 3.2.4 Network-Constrained Multi-Period Auction -- 3.2.5 Stochastic Auction -- 3.3 Intra-Day Market -- 3.4 Futures Market -- 3.5 Summary -- 3.6 End-of-Chapter Exercises -- 3.7 GAMS Codes -- References -- 4 Marginal Pricing -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Marginal Pricing and Investment-Cost Recovery -- 4.2.1 Optimal Control and Perfect Knowledge -- 4.2.2 Perfect Competition -- 4.3 Marginal Pricing and Short-Term Efficiency -- 4.3.1 Un-congested Clearing. 327 $a4.3.2 Congested Clearing -- 4.3.3 General Formulation -- 4.4 Non-convexities and Marginal Pricing -- 4.4.1 Non-convexities: Illustrative Example -- 4.4.2 Non-convexities: General Formulation -- 4.5 Uncertainty: Two-Stage Marginal Pricing -- 4.5.1 Uncertainty: Illustrative Example -- 4.5.2 Uncertainty: General Formulation -- 4.6 Multi-Period Marginal Pricing -- 4.6.1 Multi-Period: Illustrative Example -- 4.6.2 Multi-Period: General Formulation -- 4.7 Summary -- 4.8 End-of-Chapter Exercises -- 4.9 GAMS Codes -- References -- 5 Market Power -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Concept of Market Power -- 5.2.1 Monopoly -- 5.2.2 Lerner Index -- 5.2.3 Monopsony -- 5.3 Oligopoly -- 5.3.1 Game Theory -- 5.3.2 Cournot Oligopoly -- 5.3.3 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index -- 5.3.4 Stackelberg Oligopoly -- 5.4 Multiple Leaders -- 5.4.1 Market Clearing: Primal Problem, Dual Problem, and Optimality Conditions -- 5.4.2 Producer 1 Exercising Market Power -- 5.4.3 Producer 2 Exercising Market Power -- 5.4.4 Consumer 1 Exercising Market Power -- 5.4.5 Consumer 2 Exercising Market Power -- 5.4.6 Multiple Agents Exercising Market Power -- 5.5 Summary -- 5.6 End-of-Chapter Exercises -- 5.7 GAMS Codes -- References -- 6 Environmental Externalities -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Negative Externalities -- 6.3 Market-Based Mechanisms for Pollution Control -- 6.3.1 Taxation and Permit Schemes -- 6.3.2 Renewable Portfolio Standards -- 6.4 Network-Constrained Models with Externalities -- 6.4.1 First-Best Policy for CO Emissions -- 6.4.2 CO Taxation in a Deregulated Electricity Industry -- 6.4.3 Renewable Portfolio Standard in a Deregulated Electricity Industry -- 6.5 Summary -- 6.6 End-of-Chapter Exercises -- 6.7 GAMS Codes -- References -- 7 Investment -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Transmission Expansion -- 7.2.1 Transmission Expansion Under Central Planning -- Indices and Sets -- Parameters. 327 $aBinary Variables -- Continuous Variables -- 7.2.2 Bi-Level Transmission Expansion -- Dual Variables -- 7.3 Generation Expansion -- 7.3.1 Generation Expansion Under Central Planning -- 7.3.2 Bi-Level Generation Expansion -- 7.4 Summary -- 7.5 End-of-Chapter Exercises -- 7.6 GAMS Codes -- References -- Index. 410 0$aInternational Series in Operations Research and Management Science 606 $aMicroeconomics 606 $aElectric industries 606 $aElectric utilities$xCosts 615 0$aMicroeconomics. 615 0$aElectric industries. 615 0$aElectric utilities$xCosts. 676 $a333.79 700 $aTanaka$b Makoto$01219279 702 $aSiddiqui$b Afzal S. 702 $aConejo$b Antonio J. 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910556883503321 996 $aEconomics of power systems$92978529 997 $aUNINA