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024 7 $a10.1515/9780691212616
035   $a(OCoLC)1152424272
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100   $a20200421h20212021  uy             0
101 0 $aeng
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181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
182   $cc$2rdamedia
183   $acr$2rdacarrier
200 10$aSyrian requiem $ethe civil war and its aftermath /$fItamar Rabinovich, Carmit Valensi
210  1$aPrinceton :$cPrinceton University Press,$d[2021]
210  4$d?2021
215   $a1 online resource (xiv, 271 pages) $cillustrations, maps
225 0 $aGale eBooks
311   $a0-691-21261-9 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
327   $aThe Ba'th in Power, 1963-2011 -- The Syrian Civil War and Crisis, 2011-018 -- The Domestic Scene -- The Regional Arena -- International Actors -- Syria 2019-2020 -- Conclusion : From the Syrian civil war to the lingering Syrian crisis.
330   $a"The Syrian crisis is not over yet but the period of full-fledged civil war in that country appears to be drawing to a close, and it is now possible to view this calamity with some perspective. This short book will address the following questions about the conflict: How and why did quiet demonstrations in Southern Syria develop into a brutal civil war? Why did the political opposition to the regime of Bashar al-Assad remain weak and divided? How did radical Jihadi Islamists take over the main military opposition to the Syrian regime? How did the Syrian conflict become a main arena of the Saudi-Iranian regional rivalry? What explains the ambivalent Western attitude towards the Syrian rebellion? How did US policy under the Obama administration evolve and why did both Obama and Trump decide not to make a major investment in it? How stable is the status quo? And how could the conflict re-erupt in a different form? According to Rabinovitch, the Syrian regime and its supporters (including the Russians and the Iranians) have indeed emerged as victors, but it's a limited victory at best. The Syrian state under Assad controls only about 60 percent of the national territory and the potential for renewed violence is considerable. Assad's continued survival has come at the cost of deep dependency on Iran and Russia; his is now, arguably, a vassal state. This means that the country will remain in crisis for the foreseeable future, even if the full-scale civil war phase has come to an end. In his last chapter, Rabinovich will recommend policy options for the U.S"--$cProvided by publisher.
606   $aPolitical science
607   $aSyria$xHistory$yCivil War, 2011-
607   $aSyria$xPolitics and government$y2000-
607   $aSyria$xForeign relations$y21st century
607   $aSyria$xForeign relations$zUnited States
607   $aUnited States$xForeign relations$zSyria
610   $aAleppo.
610   $aArmenians.
610   $aAssyrians.
610   $aBaath.
610   $aBashar al Asad.
610   $aBath.
610   $aClinton.
610   $aDaesh.
610   $aDamascus.
610   $aDruze.
610   $aErdogan.
610   $aFSA.
610   $aFree Syrian Army.
610   $aGeneva peace process.
610   $aHafez al Asad.
610   $aHama.
610   $aHezbollah.
610   $aISIL.
610   $aISIS.
610   $aJTS.
610   $aKurds.
610   $aObama.
610   $aPKK.
610   $aPutin.
610   $aRaqqah.
610   $aSDF.
610   $aSalafi.
610   $aSufi.
610   $aSuleimani.
610   $aSunni.
610   $aSyrian Democratic Forces.
610   $aSyrian Liberation Front.
610   $aSyrian opposition.
610   $aSyrians refugees.
610   $aTrump.
610   $aUN.
610   $aUS strategy.
610   $aUnited Nations.
610   $aadministration.
610   $aal Qaeda.
610   $aalawi.
610   $aalawis.
610   $abarrel bombs.
610   $acaliphate.
610   $achemical weapons.
610   $adictator.
610   $adictatorship.
615  0$aPolitical science.
676   $a956.910423
686   $aMH 74086$qSEPA$2rvk
700   $aRabinovich$b Itamar$f1942-$0538277
702   $aValensi$b Carmit$f1980-
801  0$bMiFhGG
801  1$bMiFhGG
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910554240003321
996   $aSyrian requiem$92820118
997   $aUNINA