LEADER 03970oam 2200613 450 001 9910554203503321 005 20230629234658.0 010 $a1-5036-1475-1 024 7 $a10.1515/9781503614758 035 $a(CKB)4100000011560014 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC6382197 035 $a(DE-B1597)574736 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781503614758 035 $a(OCoLC)1157350116 035 $a(EXLCZ)994100000011560014 100 $a20210413d2021 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aUnited front $eprojecting solidaritythrough deliberation in Vietnam's single-party legislature /$fPaul Schuler 210 1$aStanford, California :$cStanford University Press,$d[2021] 210 4$d©2021 215 $a1 online resource (270 pages) 225 1 $aStudies of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center 311 $a1-5036-1462-X 327 $tFrontmatter -- $tContents -- $tIllustrations -- $tAcknowledgments -- $tIntroduction -- $tOne The Signaling Trap Why Single-Party Legislatures Must Be Controlled -- $tTwo How Elections Work in Vietnam -- $tThree ?Unconditional Party Government? Legislative Organization in the VNA -- $tFour Explaining the Evolution of the VNA -- $tFive Mobilized or Motivated? Voting Behavior in Vietnamese Elections -- $tSix Explaining Oversight Behavior Position Taking or Position Ducking? -- $tSeven Intimidation or Legitimation? The Signaling Value of the VNA -- $tConclusion Curbing Our Expectations for the VNA, Single-Party Legislatures -- $tNotes -- $tReferences -- $tIndex 330 $aConventional wisdom emerging from China and other autocracies claims that single-party legislatures and elections are mutually beneficial for citizens and autocrats. This line of thought reasons that these institutions can serve multiple functions, like constraining political leaders or providing information about citizens. In United Front, Paul Schuler challenges these views through his examination of the past and present functioning of the Vietnam National Assembly (VNA), arguing that the legislature's primary role is to signal strength to the public. When active, the critical behavior from delegates in the legislature represents cross fire within the regime rather than genuine citizen feedback. In making these arguments, Schuler counters a growing scholarly trend to see democratic institutions within single-party settings like China and Vietnam as useful for citizens or regime performance. His argument also suggests that there are limits to generating genuinely "consultative authoritarianism" through quasi-democratic institutions. Applying a diverse range of cutting-edge social science methods on a wealth of original data such as legislative speeches, election returns, and surveys, Schuler shows that even in a seemingly vociferous legislature like the VNA, the ultimate purpose of the institution is not to reflect the views of citizens, but rather to signal the regime's preferences while taking down rivals. 410 0$aStudies of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. 606 $aAuthoritarianism$zVietnam 606 $aLegislative bodies$zVietnam 607 $aVietnam$xPolitics and government$y1975- 610 $aChina. 610 $aSoutheast Asia. 610 $aVietnam. 610 $aauthoritarian elections. 610 $aauthoritarian institutions. 610 $aauthoritarian legislatures. 610 $aauthoritarian regimes. 610 $aco-optation. 610 $apower sharing. 610 $asignaling. 615 0$aAuthoritarianism 615 0$aLegislative bodies 676 $a320.53 700 $aSchuler$b Paul$f1979-$01219594 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bUtOrBLW 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910554203503321 996 $aUnited front$92819971 997 $aUNINA