LEADER 04179nam 22006255 450 001 9910544870303321 005 20230810174546.0 010 $a9783030940881$b(electronic bk.) 010 $z9783030940874 024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-030-94088-1 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC6885902 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL6885902 035 $a(CKB)21167809300041 035 $a(DE-He213)978-3-030-94088-1 035 $a(EXLCZ)9921167809300041 100 $a20220209d2022 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aDelusions of Competence $eThe Near-Death of Lloyd?s of London 1970--2002 /$fby Robin Pearson 205 $a1st ed. 2022. 210 1$aCham :$cSpringer International Publishing :$cImprint: Palgrave Macmillan,$d2022. 215 $a1 online resource (140 pages) 225 1 $aPalgrave Studies in Economic History,$x2662-6500 311 08$aPrint version: Pearson, Robin Delusions of Competence Cham : Springer International Publishing AG,c2022 9783030940874 327 $aChapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: Lloyd?s: its history and business practices -- Chapter 3: Lloyd?s people: their social composition and political economy -- Chapter 4: Expansion, scandals and frauds ? Lloyd?s in the 1970s -- Chapter 5: The first reforms and public scrutiny -- Chapter 6: The school for scandals -- Chapter 7: Liability crisis, LMX spiral and collapse -- Chapter 8: Reform, survival and recovery -- Chapter 9: Conclusions ? delusions of competence -- Chapter 10: Epilogue ? Lloyd?s redivivus. 330 $aThis book examines the crisis at the famous insurance market, Lloyd's of London, during the late twentieth century, which nearly destroyed the 300-year-old institution. While rapid structural change resulting from system collapse is less common in insurance than in the history of other financial services, one exception was the Lloyd?s crisis. Hitherto, explanations of the crisis have focused on the effects of catastrophic losses and poor governance. By drawing on contemporary accounts of the crisis, the author constructs the first comprehensive scholarly analysis of the public and political response. The book applies theoretical concepts from behavioural economics and economic psychology to argue that multiple delusions of competence were at work both within and outside the Lloyd?s market. Arrogance, elitism and defence of vested interests comprised endogenous elements of the crisis. Entrenched ideas about the virtues of self-regulation and faith in insider experts also played a role. The result was a misdiagnosis by both insiders and politicians of what ailed Lloyd?s and a series of reforms that failed to address the underlying causes of its disease. This book offers a salutary lesson from recent history about the importance of the transparency, accountability and effective monitoring of financial institutions. It is of interest to academics and students of economic and financial history, business, insurance, political economy and history. Robin Pearson is Professor of Economic History at the University of Hull, UK. He has published widely on British and international economic and business history, with a particular focus on insurance. . 410 0$aPalgrave Studies in Economic History,$x2662-6500 606 $aEconomic history 606 $aFinance 606 $aHistory 606 $aEconomics$xPsychological aspects 606 $aEconomic History 606 $aFinancial History 606 $aBehavioral Economics 606 $aEconomic Psychology 615 0$aEconomic history. 615 0$aFinance. 615 0$aHistory. 615 0$aEconomics$xPsychological aspects. 615 14$aEconomic History. 615 24$aFinancial History. 615 24$aBehavioral Economics. 615 24$aEconomic Psychology. 676 $a368 676 $a368.0120604212 700 $aPearson$b Robin$01194349 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 912 $a9910544870303321 996 $aDelusions of Competence$92762708 997 $aUNINA