LEADER 01054cam2-2200361---450 001 990000614540203316 005 20180529124532.0 035 $a0061454 035 $aUSA010061454 035 $a(ALEPH)000061454USA01 035 $a0061454 100 $a20010910d1980----km-y0itay5003----ba 101 $aita 102 $aIT 105 $aaf f 00 y 200 1 $a<> Opinione-Probabilità 210 $aTorino$cEinaudi$d1980 215 $aX, 1187 p., [16] carte di tav.$cill.$d22 cm 300 $aTraduzioni di vari 461 0$10010060125$12001$aEnciclopedia 801 0$aIT$bsalbc$gISBD 912 $a990000614540203316 951 $aI.1.B. 035 12 10(035 12 10)$b58982 E.C.$cI.1.$d411448 959 $aBK 969 $aUMA 969 $aTEC 979 $aPATTY$b90$c20010910$lUSA01$h1112 979 $c20020403$lUSA01$h1711 979 $aPATRY$b90$c20040406$lUSA01$h1643 979 $aCOPAT2$b90$c20051124$lUSA01$h1239 979 $aCOPAT6$b90$c20070104$lUSA01$h0926 996 $aOpinione-Probabilità$9957798 997 $aUNISA LEADER 05442nam 22008055 450 001 9910522934203321 005 20251225212254.0 010 $a3-030-94676-2 024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0 035 $a(CKB)5670000000197644 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC6875086 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL6875086 035 $a(PPN)268905681 035 $a(BIP)83052286 035 $a(BIP)82524727 035 $a(DE-He213)978-3-030-94676-0 035 $a(EXLCZ)995670000000197644 100 $a20220120d2022 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aWeb and Internet Economics $e17th International Conference, WINE 2021, Potsdam, Germany, December 14?17, 2021, Proceedings /$fedited by Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Inbal Talgam-Cohen 205 $a1st ed. 2022. 210 1$aCham :$cSpringer International Publishing :$cImprint: Springer,$d2022. 215 $a1 online resource (563 pages) 225 1 $aInformation Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI,$x2946-1642 ;$v13112 311 08$a3-030-94675-4 327 $aMechanism Design and Pricing -- Two-way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality -- Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials -- The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing -- On Symmetries in Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design -- Welfare-Preserving $nvarepsilon$-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss -- Strategyproof Facility Location in Perturbation Stable Instances -- Contract Design for A orestation Programs -- Relaxing the independence assumption in sequential posted pricing, prophet inequality, and random bipartite matching -- Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness -- On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals -- Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auction -- Matching, Markets and Equilibria -- Improved Analysis of RANKING for Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching in the Random Order Model -- Beyond Pigouvian Taxes: A Worst Case Analysis -- The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home -- Mechanisms for Trading Durable Goods -- Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem -- Threshold Tests as Quality Signals: Optimal Strategies, Equilibria, and Price of Anarchy -- The Platform Design Problem -- A Consumer-Theoretic Characterization of Fisher Market Equilibria -- Learning, Fairness, Privacy and Behavioral Models A tight negative example for MMS fair allocations -- Approximating Nash Social Welfare Under Binary XOS and Binary Subadditive Valuations -- Default Ambiguity: Finding the Best Solution to the Clearing Problem -- Planning on an Empty Stomach: On Agents with Projection Bias -- Eliciting Social Knowledge for Creditworthiness Assessment -- Social Choice and Cryptocurrencies -- Decentralized Asset Custody Scheme with Security against Rational Adversary -- The Distortion of Distributed Metric Social Choice -- Maximal Information Propagation via Lotteries -- Envy-free division ofmulti-layered cakes -- Computing envy-freeable allocations with limited subsidies. 330 $aThis book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2021, which was held online during December 14-17, 2021. The conference was originally planned to take place in Potsdam, Germany, but changed to a virtual event due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The 41 full papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 146 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: mechanism design and pricing; matching, markets and equilibria; learning, fairness, privacy and behavioral models; social choice and cryptocurrencies. 410 0$aInformation Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI,$x2946-1642 ;$v13112 606 $aAlgorithms 606 $aArtificial intelligence 606 $aElectronic commerce 606 $aData structures (Computer science) 606 $aInformation theory 606 $aApplication software 606 $aComputer science$xMathematics 606 $aDesign and Analysis of Algorithms 606 $aArtificial Intelligence 606 $ae-Commerce and e-Business 606 $aData Structures and Information Theory 606 $aComputer and Information Systems Applications 606 $aMathematics of Computing 615 0$aAlgorithms. 615 0$aArtificial intelligence. 615 0$aElectronic commerce. 615 0$aData structures (Computer science). 615 0$aInformation theory. 615 0$aApplication software. 615 0$aComputer science$xMathematics. 615 14$aDesign and Analysis of Algorithms. 615 24$aArtificial Intelligence. 615 24$ae-Commerce and e-Business. 615 24$aData Structures and Information Theory. 615 24$aComputer and Information Systems Applications. 615 24$aMathematics of Computing. 676 $a380.1 676 $a303.4833 702 $aFeldman$b Michal 702 $aFu$b Hu 702 $aTalgam-Cohen$b Inbal 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910522934203321 996 $aWeb and Internet Economics$92593958 997 $aUNINA