LEADER 04825nam 22005051 450 001 9910494713303321 005 20200514202323.0 010 $a1-78451-065-3 010 $a1-78451-214-1 024 7 $a10.5040/9781784510657 035 $a(CKB)4970000000122617 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC6179642 035 $a(OCoLC)1102435441 035 $a(UkLoBP)bpp09262561 035 $a(EXLCZ)994970000000122617 100 $a20181127h20182017 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aSpencer Bower: reliance-based estoppel $ethe law of reliance-based estoppel and related doctrines /$fPiers Feltham, Peter Crampin, Tom Leech and Joshua Winfield 205 $aFifth edition. 210 4$dİ2017 210 1$aHaywards Heath :$cBloomsbury Professional,$d2018. 215 $a1 online resource (799 pages) 300 $aIncludes index. 311 $a1-84766-570-5 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aPart I. General principles -- Part II. Particular applications of reliance-based estoppel -- Part III. Proprietary estoppel, election, promissory estoppel and procedure. 330 $a"Spencer Bower: Reliance-Based Estoppel, previously titled Estoppel by Representation, is the highly regarded and long established textbook on the doctrines of reliance-based estoppel, by which a party is prevented from changing his position if he has induced another to rely on it such that the other will suffer by that change. Since the fourth edition in 2003 the House of Lords has decided two proprietary estoppel cases, Cobbe v Yeoman's Row Property Management Ltd and Thorner v Major, whose combined effect is identified as helping to define a criterion for a reliance-based estoppel founded on a representation, namely that the party estopped actually intends the estoppel raiser to act in reliance on the representation, or is reasonably understood to intend him so to act. Other developments in the doctrine of proprietary estoppel have required a complete revision of the related chapter, Chapter 12, in this edition. Thorner v Major confirms too the submission in the fourth edition that unequivocality is a requirement for any reliance-based estoppel founded on a representation. Other views expressed in the fourth edition are also noted to have been upheld, such as the recognition that an estoppel may be founded on a representation of law (Briggs v Gleeds), that a party may preclude itself from denying a proposition by contract as well as another's reliance (Peekay Intermark Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd and Springwell Navigation Corp v JP Morgan Chase Bank) and that an estoppel by deed binds by agreement or declaration under seal rather than by reason of reliance (Prime Sight Ltd v Lavarello). With the adjustment reflected in the change of title, and distinguishing the foundation of estoppels that bind by deed and by contract, the editors adopt Spencer Bower's unificatory project by the identification of the reliance-based estoppels as aspects of a single principle preventing a change of position that would be unfair by reason of responsibility for prejudicial reliance. From this follow the views: that reliance-based estoppels have common requirements of responsibility, causation and prejudice; that estoppel by representation of fact is, like the other reliance-based estoppels, a rule of law; that the result of estoppel by representation of fact may, accordingly, be mitigated on equitable grounds to avoid injustice; that the result of an estoppel by convention depends on whether its subject matter is factual, promissory or proprietary; that a reliance-based estoppel (other than a proprietary estoppel, which uniquely generates a cause of action) may be deployed to complete a cause of action where, absent the estoppel, a cause of action would not lie, unless it would unacceptably subvert a rule of law (in particular the doctrine of consideration); that an estoppel as to a right in or over property generates a discretionary remedy; and that the prohibition on the deployment of a promissory estoppel as a sword should be understood as an application of the defence of illegality, viz that an estoppel may not unacceptably subvert a statute or rule of law."--Bloomsbury Publishing. 606 $aEstoppel$vTextbooks 615 0$aEstoppel 676 $a340.0942 700 $aFeltham$b Piers$01030690 702 $aLeech$b Tom$c(Barrister), 702 $aCrampin$b Peter 702 $aWinfield$b Joshua 801 0$bUtOrBLW 801 1$bUtOrBLW 801 2$bUkLoBP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910494713303321 996 $aSpencer Bower: reliance-based estoppel$92447703 997 $aUNINA LEADER 06481oam 2200769Ia 450 001 9910791290503321 005 20190503073351.0 010 $a0-262-26447-1 010 $a1-282-69477-4 010 $a9786612694776 010 $a0-262-25922-2 024 8 $a9786612694776 024 3 $a9780262259224 035 $a(CKB)2560000000007137 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000340325 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11247531 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000340325 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10387048 035 $a(PQKB)10004091 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0000131002 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3339088 035 $a(OCoLC)503092562$z(OCoLC)643588851$z(OCoLC)646839596$z(OCoLC)663077471$z(OCoLC)748590943$z(OCoLC)961543323$z(OCoLC)963723092$z(OCoLC)966233333$z(OCoLC)988438542$z(OCoLC)992033207$z(OCoLC)1000437705$z(OCoLC)1004384667$z(OCoLC)1055377730$z(OCoLC)1066573790$z(OCoLC)1081296515 035 $a(OCoLC-P)503092562 035 $a(MaCbMITP)8434 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3339088 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10340971 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL269477 035 $a(OCoLC)816568715 035 $a(EXLCZ)992560000000007137 100 $a20100202d2010 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aMental reality /$fGalen Strawson 205 $a2nd ed., with a new appendix. 210 $aCambridge, Mass. $cMIT Press$dİ2010 210 4$dİ2010 215 $a1 online resource (xx, 373 p.) $cill 225 1 $aRepresentation and mind 300 $a"A Bradford book." 311 $a0-262-51310-2 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aA default position -- Experience -- The character of experience -- Understanding-experience -- A note about dispositional mental states -- Purely experiential content -- An account of four seconds of thought -- Questions -- The mental and the nonmental -- The mental and the publicly observable -- The mental and the behavioral -- Neobehaviorism and reductionism -- Naturalism in the philosophy of mind -- Conclusion: The three questions -- Agnostic materialism, part 1 -- Monism -- The linguistic argument -- Materialism and monism -- A comment on reduction -- The impossibility of an objective phenomenology -- Asymmetry and reduction -- Equal-status monism -- Panpsychism -- The inescapability of metaphysics -- Agnostic materialism, part 2 -- Ignorance -- Sensory spaces -- Experience, explanation, and theoretical integration -- The hard part of the mind-body problem -- Neutral monism and agnostic monism -- A comment on eliminativism, instrumentalism, and so on -- Mentalism, idealism, and immaterialism -- Mentalism -- Strict or pure process idealism -- Active-principle idealism -- Stuff idealism -- Immaterialism -- The positions restated -- The dualist options -- Frege's thesis -- Objections to pure process idealism -- The problem of mental dispositions -- Mental -- Shared abilities -- The sorting ability -- The definition of mental being -- Mental phenomena -- The view that all mental phenomena are experiential phenomena -- Natural intentionality -- E/c intentionality -- The experienceless -- Intentionality and abstract and nonexistent objects -- Experience, purely experiential content, and n/c intentionality -- Concepts in nature -- Intentionality and experience -- Summary with problem -- Pain and pain -- The neo-behaviorist view -- A linguistic argument for the necessary connection between pain and behavior -- A challenge -- The Sirians -- N.N. Novel -- An objection to the Sirians -- The Betelgeuzians -- The point of the Sirians -- Functionalism, naturalism, and realism about pain -- Unpleasantness and qualitative character -- The weather watchers -- The rooting story -- What is it like to be a weather watcher? -- The aptitudes of mental states -- The argument from the conditions for possessing the concept of space -- The argument from the conditions for language ability -- The argument from the nature of desire -- Desire and affect -- The argument from the phenomenology of desire -- Behavior -- A hopeless definition -- Difficulties -- Other-observability -- Neo-behaviorism -- The concept of mind. 330 $a"In Mental reality, Galen Strawson argues that much contemporary philosophy of mind gives undue primacy of place to publicly observable phenomena, nonmental phenomena, and behavioral phenomena (understood as publicly observable phenomena) in its account of the nature of mind. It does so at the expense of the phenomena of conscious experience. Strawson describes an alternative position, "naturalized Cartesianism," which couples the materialist view that mind is entirely natural and wholly physical with a fully realist account of the nature of conscious experience. Naturalized Cartesianism is an adductive (as opposed to reductive) form of materialism. Adductive materialists don't claim that conscious experience is anything less than we ordinarily conceive it to be, in being wholly physical. They claim instead that the physical is something more than we ordinarily conceive it to be, given that many of the wholly physical goings on in the brain constitute--literally are--conscious experiences as we ordinarily conceive them. Since naturalized Cartesianism downgrades the place of reference to nonmental and publicly observable phenomena in an adequate account of mental phenomena, Strawson considers in detail the question of what part such reference still has to play. He argues that it is a mistake to think that all behavioral phenomena are publicly observable phenomena. This revised and expanded edition of Mental Reality includes a new appendix, which thoroughly revises the account of intentionality given in chapter 7"--MIT CogNet. 410 0$aRepresentation and mind. 606 $aConsciousness 606 $aBehaviorism (Psychology) 606 $aMind and body 606 $aMaterialism 606 $aPhilosophy of mind 610 $aPHILOSOPHY/Philosophy of Mind/General 610 $aCOGNITIVE SCIENCES/General 615 0$aConsciousness. 615 0$aBehaviorism (Psychology) 615 0$aMind and body. 615 0$aMaterialism. 615 0$aPhilosophy of mind. 676 $a128/.2 700 $aStrawson$b Galen$0953504 801 0$bOCoLC-P 801 1$bOCoLC-P 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910791290503321 996 $aMental reality$93812333 997 $aUNINA